Replace vendored libcurl and minhook with submodules (#500)v1.17.1-rc1

* Replace vendored libcurl and minhook with submodules
* Add cmake utility for checking submodules and initializing them
* Update build instructions to use Git

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 109 deletions

diff --git a/thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h b/thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h
deleted file mode 100644
index f4d1d954..00000000
--- a/thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef OSSL_PROVIDER_RAND_POOL_H
-# define OSSL_PROVIDER_RAND_POOL_H
-# pragma once
-
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-/*
- * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers
- *
- * The max_len value for the buffer provided to the rand_drbg_get_entropy()
- * callback is currently 2^31 bytes (2 gigabytes), if a derivation function
- * is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the ossl_rand_pool_new()
- * function chooses more modest values as default pool length, bounded
- * by RAND_POOL_MIN_LENGTH and RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH
- *
- * The choice of the RAND_POOL_FACTOR is large enough such that the
- * RAND_POOL can store a random input which has a lousy entropy rate of
- * 8/256 (= 0.03125) bits per byte. This input will be sent through the
- * derivation function which 'compresses' the low quality input into a
- * high quality output.
- *
- * The factor 1.5 below is the pessimistic estimate for the extra amount
- * of entropy required when no get_nonce() callback is defined.
- */
-# define RAND_POOL_FACTOR        256
-# define RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH    (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \
-                                  3 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 16))
-/*
- *                             = (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \
- *                                1.5 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8))
- */
-
-/*
- * Initial allocation minimum.
- *
- * There is a distinction between the secure and normal allocation minimums.
- * Ideally, the secure allocation size should be a power of two.  The normal
- * allocation size doesn't have any such restriction.
- *
- * The secure value is based on 128 bits of secure material, which is 16 bytes.
- * Typically, the DRBGs will set a minimum larger than this so optimal
- * allocation ought to take place (for full quality seed material).
- *
- * The normal value has been chosen by noticing that the rand_drbg_get_nonce
- * function is usually the largest of the built in allocation (twenty four
- * bytes and then appending another sixteen bytes).  This means the buffer ends
- * with 40 bytes.  The value of forty eight is comfortably above this which
- * allows some slack in the platform specific values used.
- */
-# define RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure) ((secure) ? 16 : 48)
-
-/*
- * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random
- * input from various entropy sources. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize
- * the random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and
- * 4) cleanup the random pool again.
- *
- * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and
- * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame.
- */
-typedef struct rand_pool_st {
-    unsigned char *buffer;  /* points to the beginning of the random pool */
-    size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */
-
-    int attached;  /* true pool was attached to existing buffer */
-    int secure;    /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */
-
-    size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */
-    size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */
-    size_t alloc_len; /* current number of bytes allocated */
-    size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */
-    size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */
-} RAND_POOL;
-
-RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
-                              size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
-RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
-                                 size_t entropy);
-void ossl_rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool);
-
-const unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool);
-unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool);
-void ossl_rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer);
-
-size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
-size_t ossl_rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool);
-
-size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool);
-size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool);
-/* |entropy_factor| expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy */
-size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor);
-size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool);
-
-int ossl_rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
-                       const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy);
-unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len);
-int ossl_rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy);
-
-#endif /* OSSL_PROVIDER_RAND_POOL_H */