From d3fb76f889101f024f410c194a66f0f4a2f6c4a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2023 02:22:26 +0200 Subject: Replace vendored libcurl and minhook with submodules (#500) * Replace vendored libcurl and minhook with submodules * Add cmake utility for checking submodules and initializing them * Update build instructions to use Git --- thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h | 109 ------------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 109 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h (limited to 'thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h') diff --git a/thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h b/thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h deleted file mode 100644 index f4d1d954..00000000 --- a/thirdparty/crypto/rand_pool.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#ifndef OSSL_PROVIDER_RAND_POOL_H -# define OSSL_PROVIDER_RAND_POOL_H -# pragma once - -# include -# include - -/* - * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers - * - * The max_len value for the buffer provided to the rand_drbg_get_entropy() - * callback is currently 2^31 bytes (2 gigabytes), if a derivation function - * is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the ossl_rand_pool_new() - * function chooses more modest values as default pool length, bounded - * by RAND_POOL_MIN_LENGTH and RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH - * - * The choice of the RAND_POOL_FACTOR is large enough such that the - * RAND_POOL can store a random input which has a lousy entropy rate of - * 8/256 (= 0.03125) bits per byte. This input will be sent through the - * derivation function which 'compresses' the low quality input into a - * high quality output. - * - * The factor 1.5 below is the pessimistic estimate for the extra amount - * of entropy required when no get_nonce() callback is defined. - */ -# define RAND_POOL_FACTOR 256 -# define RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \ - 3 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 16)) -/* - * = (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \ - * 1.5 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8)) - */ - -/* - * Initial allocation minimum. - * - * There is a distinction between the secure and normal allocation minimums. - * Ideally, the secure allocation size should be a power of two. The normal - * allocation size doesn't have any such restriction. - * - * The secure value is based on 128 bits of secure material, which is 16 bytes. - * Typically, the DRBGs will set a minimum larger than this so optimal - * allocation ought to take place (for full quality seed material). - * - * The normal value has been chosen by noticing that the rand_drbg_get_nonce - * function is usually the largest of the built in allocation (twenty four - * bytes and then appending another sixteen bytes). This means the buffer ends - * with 40 bytes. The value of forty eight is comfortably above this which - * allows some slack in the platform specific values used. - */ -# define RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure) ((secure) ? 16 : 48) - -/* - * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random - * input from various entropy sources. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize - * the random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and - * 4) cleanup the random pool again. - * - * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and - * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame. - */ -typedef struct rand_pool_st { - unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */ - size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */ - - int attached; /* true pool was attached to existing buffer */ - int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */ - - size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */ - size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */ - size_t alloc_len; /* current number of bytes allocated */ - size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */ - size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */ -} RAND_POOL; - -RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure, - size_t min_len, size_t max_len); -RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, - size_t entropy); -void ossl_rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool); - -const unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool); -unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool); -void ossl_rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer); - -size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool); -size_t ossl_rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool); - -size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool); -size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool); -/* |entropy_factor| expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy */ -size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor); -size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool); - -int ossl_rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, - const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy); -unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len); -int ossl_rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy); - -#endif /* OSSL_PROVIDER_RAND_POOL_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3