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Closes #12529
Closes #12511
Closes #6835
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The next revision of the specification is going to include a context
string in the way blinded scalars are computed.
See:
https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-signature-key-blinding/issues/30#issuecomment-1180516152
https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-signature-key-blinding/pull/37
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This reverts commit 7cbd586ace46a8e8cebab660ebca3cfc049305d9.
This is causing a fail to build from source:
```
./lib/std/fmt.zig:492:17: error: cannot format optional without a specifier (i.e. {?} or {any})
@compileError("cannot format optional without a specifier (i.e. {?} or {any})");
^
./src/link/MachO/Atom.zig:544:26: note: called from here
log.debug(" RELA({s}) @ {x} => %{d} in object({d})", .{
^
```
I looked at the code to fix it but none of those args are optionals.
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Co-authored-by: Veikka Tuominen <git@vexu.eu>
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Key blinding allows public keys to be augmented with a secret
scalar, making multiple signatures from the same signer unlinkable.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dew-cfrg-signature-key-blinding/
This is required by privacy-preserving applications such as Tor
onion services and the PrivacyPass protocol.
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The Ecdsa.PublicKey type is not a direct alias for a curve element.
So, use the inner field containing the curve element for serialization.
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Gimli was a game changer. A permutation that is large enough to be
used in sponge-like constructions, yet small enough to be compact
to implement and fast on a wide range of platforms.
And Gimli being part of the Zig standard library was awesome.
But since then, Gimli entered the NIST Lightweight Cryptography
Competition, competing againt other candidates sharing a similar set
of properties.
Unfortunately, Gimli didn't pass the 3rd round.
There are no practical attacks against Gimli when used correctly, but
NIST's decision means that Gimli is unlikely to ever get any traction.
So, maybe the time has come to move Gimli from the standard library
to another repository.
We shouldn't do it without providing an alternative, though.
And the best candidate for this is probably Xoodoo.
Xoodoo is the core function of Xoodyak, one of the finalists of the
NIST LWC competition, and the most direct competitor to Gimli. It is
also a 384-bit permutation, so it can easily be used everywhere Gimli
was used with no parameter changes.
It is the building block of Xoodyak (for actual encryption and hashing)
as well as Charm, that some Zig applications are already using.
Like Gimli that it was heavily inspired from, it is compact and
suitable for constrained environments.
This change adds the Xoodoo permutation to std.crypto.core.
The set of public functions includes everything required to later
implement existing Xoodoo-based constructions.
In order to prepare for the Gimli deprecation, the default
CSPRNG was changed to a Xoodoo-based that works exactly the same way.
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A hash function cascade was a common way to avoid length-extension
attacks with traditional hash functions such as the SHA-2 family.
Add `std.crypto.hash.composition` to do exactly that using arbitrary
hash functions, and pre-define the common SHA2-based ones.
With this, we can now sign and verify Bitcoin signatures in pure Zig.
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std.crypto.ecc: add support for the secp256k1 curve
Usage of the secp256k1 elliptic curve recently grew exponentially,
since this is the curve used by Bitcoin and other popular blockchains
such as Ethereum.
With this, Zig has support for all the widely deployed elliptic curves
today.
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For 25519, it's very likely that applications would ever need the
serialized representation. Expose the value as an integer as in
other curves. Rename the internal representation from `field_size`
to `field_order` for consistency.
Also fix a common typo in `scalar.sub()`.
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Unlike curve25519 where the scalar size is not large enough to fill
the top nibble, this can definitely be the case for p256 and p384.
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This valid zig code produces reasonable LLVM IR, however, on the
wasm32-wasi target, when using the wasmtime runtime, the number of
locals of the `isSquare` function exceeds 50000, causing wasmtime
to refuse to execute the binary.
The `inline` keyword in Zig is intended to be used only where it is
semantically necessary; not as an optimization hint. Otherwise, this may
produce unwanted binary bloat for the -OReleaseSmall use case.
In the future, it is possible that we may end up with both `inline`
keyword, which operates as it does in status quo, and additionally
`callconv(.inline_hint)` which has no semantic impact, but may be
observed by optimization passes.
In this commit, I also cleaned up `isSquare` by eliminating an
unnecessary mutable variable, replacing it with several local constants.
Closes #11947.
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ECDSA is the most commonly used signature scheme today, mainly for
historical and conformance reasons. It is a necessary evil for
many standard protocols such as TLS and JWT.
It is tricky to implement securely and has been the root cause of
multiple security disasters, from the Playstation 3 hack to multiple
critical issues in OpenSSL and Java.
This implementation combines lessons learned from the past with
recent recommendations.
In Zig, the NIST curves that ECDSA is almost always instantied with
use formally verified field arithmetic, giving us peace of mind
even on edge cases. And the API rejects neutral elements where it
matters, and unconditionally checks for non-canonical encoding for
scalars and group elements. This automatically eliminates common
vulnerabilities such as https://sk.tl/2LpS695v .
ECDSA's security heavily relies on the security of the random number
generator, which is a concern in some environments.
This implementation mitigates this by computing deterministic
nonces using the conservative scheme from Pornin et al. with the
optional addition of randomness as proposed in Ericsson's
"Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness"
document. This approach mitigates both the implications of a weak RNG
and the practical implications of fault attacks.
Project Wycheproof is a Google project to test crypto libraries against
known attacks by triggering edge cases. It discovered vulnerabilities
in virtually all major ECDSA implementations.
The entire set of ECDSA-P256-SHA256 test vectors from Project Wycheproof
is included here. Zero defects were found in this implementation.
The public API differs from the Ed25519 one. Instead of raw byte strings
for keys and signatures, we introduce Signature, PublicKey and SecretKey
structures.
The reason is that a raw byte representation would not be optimal.
There are multiple standard representations for keys and signatures,
and decoding/encoding them may not be cheap (field elements have to be
converted from/to the montgomery domain).
So, the intent is to eventually move ed25519 to the same API, which
is not going to introduce any performance regression, but will bring
us a consistent API, that we can also reuse for RSA.
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After P-256, here comes P-384, also known as secp384r1.
Like P-256, it is required for TLS, and is the current NIST recommendation for key exchange and signatures, for better or for worse.
Like P-256, all the finite field arithmetic has been computed and verified to be correct by fiat-crypto.
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Add the ability to generate a random, canonical curve25519 scalar,
like we do for p256.
Also leverage the existing CompressedScalar type to represent these
scalars.
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std.crypto: cosmetic improvement to AES multiplication algorithm (#11616)
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* std/crypto: generate AES constants at compile time
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Frank Denis <124872+jedisct1@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update lib/std/crypto/aes/soft.zig
* Separate encryption and decryption tables
* Run `zig fmt`
* Increase branch quota and remove redundant align
* Update lib/std/crypto/aes/soft.zig
Co-authored-by: Frank Denis <124872+jedisct1@users.noreply.github.com>
* Rename identifiers and simplify dataflow
* Increase branch quota (again) and fix comment
Co-authored-by: Frank Denis <124872+jedisct1@users.noreply.github.com>
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* edwards25519: fix X coordinate of the base point
Reported by @OfekShochat -- Thanks!
* edwards25519: reduce public scalar when the top bit is set, not cleared
This is an optimization for the unexpected case of a scalar
larger than the field size.
Fixes #11563
* edwards25519: add a test implicit reduction of invalid scalars
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This is the x25519 counterpart to `edwards25519.clearCofactor()`.
It is useful to check for low-order points in protocols where it matters and where clamping cannot work, such as PAKEs.
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Fixes #11353
The renderer treats comments and doc comments differently since doc
comments are parsed into the Ast. This commit adds a check after getting
the text for the doc comment and trims whitespace at the end before
rendering.
The `a = 0,` in the test is here to avoid a ParseError while parsing the
test.
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closes #10705
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This makes packaging Zig for Debian slightly easier since it will no
longer trigger a Lintian warning for long lines.
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This operation is extremely useful for multiplicative blinding.
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Make recovery of the x-coordinate slightly faster.
See https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qlKpMBqxXZYmDpXXIx6LO3Oznv4/
for details.
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* Make bcrypt State struct public
This is useful to implement the various protocols outside of the standard library
* Implement bcrypt pbkdf
This variant is used in e.g. SSH
The OpenBSD implementation was used as a reference
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zig fmt now replaces c_void with anyopaque to make updating
code easy.
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See #3811
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more haiku support
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add fast kdf test
fix inconsistent kdf error
refactor
Co-authored-by: lucky <>
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No security implications, but the current hash-to-curve standard
defines the sign of the Y coordinate to be negative if `gx1`
is a square, positive otherwise.
We were doing it the other way round.
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These changes have been made to resolve issue #10037. The `Random`
interface was implemented in such a way that causes significant slowdown
when calling the `fill` function of the rng used.
The `Random` interface is no longer stored in a field of the rng, and is
instead returned by the child function `random()` of the rng. This
avoids the performance issues caused by the interface.
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