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(#22792)
* bcrypt: make silently_truncate_password a member of Params
This removes the need for having both `bcrypt()` and
`bcryptWithTruncation()` in the public API.
And whether truncation happens or not becomes even more explicit.
* Update crypto benchmark
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They way OpenSSH does key derivation to protect keys using a password
is not the standard PBKDF2, but something funky, picking key material
non-linearly.
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std.crypto has quite a few instances of breaking naming conventions.
This is the beginning of an effort to address that.
Deprecates `std.crypto.utils`.
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These parameters according to the OWASP cheat sheet.
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Let's take this breaking change opportunity to fix the style of this
enum.
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Use inline to vastly simplify the exposed API. This allows a
comptime-known endian parameter to be propogated, making extra functions
for a specific endianness completely unnecessary.
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This reverts commit 6f0198cadbe29294f2bf3153a27beebd64377566.
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This reverts commit 0c99ba1eab63865592bb084feb271cd4e4b0357e, reversing
changes made to 5f92b070bf284f1493b1b5d433dd3adde2f46727.
This caused a CI failure when it landed in master branch due to a
128-bit `@byteSwap` in std.mem.
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Most of this migration was performed automatically with `zig fmt`. There
were a few exceptions which I had to manually fix:
* `@alignCast` and `@addrSpaceCast` cannot be automatically rewritten
* `@truncate`'s fixup is incorrect for vectors
* Test cases are not formatted, and their error locations change
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crypto.bcrypt: allow very large passwords to be pre-hashed
bcrypt has a slightly annoying limitation: passwords are limited
to 72 characters. In the original implementation, additional characters
are silently ignored.
When they care, applications adopt different strategies to work around
this, in incompatible ways.
Ideally, large passwords should be pre-hashed using a hash function that
hinders GPU attackers, and the hashed function should not be deterministic
in order to defeat shucking attacks.
This change improves the developer experience by adding a very explicit
`silently_truncate_password` option, that can be set to `false` in
order to do that automatically, and consistently across Zig applications.
By default, passwords are still truncated, so this is not a breaking
change.
Add some inline documentation for our beloved autodoc by the way.
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state: State -> state: *const State
Suggested by @nektro
Fixes #13510
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std/crypto/benchmark.zig results:
* Intel i5
before: 3.144 s/ops
after: 1.922 s/ops
* Apple M1
before: 2.067 s/ops
after: 1.373 s/ops
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Now that std.base64 supports everything bcrypt needs to encode its
parameters, we don't need to include another implementation.
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This makes packaging Zig for Debian slightly easier since it will no
longer trigger a Lintian warning for long lines.
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* Make bcrypt State struct public
This is useful to implement the various protocols outside of the standard library
* Implement bcrypt pbkdf
This variant is used in e.g. SSH
The OpenBSD implementation was used as a reference
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We already have a LICENSE file that covers the Zig Standard Library. We
no longer need to remind everyone that the license is MIT in every single
file.
Previously this was introduced to clarify the situation for a fork of
Zig that made Zig's LICENSE file harder to find, and replaced it with
their own license that required annual payments to their company.
However that fork now appears to be dead. So there is no need to
reinforce the copyright notice in every single file.
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add phc encoding parser
add password hash functions to benchmark
change bcrypt to be consistent with scrypt
Co-authored-by: lucky <>
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std/crypto: use finer-grained error sets in function signatures
Returning the `crypto.Error` error set for all crypto operations
was very convenient to ensure that errors were used consistently,
and to avoid having multiple error names for the same thing.
The flipside is that callers were forced to always handle all
possible errors, even those that could never be returned by a
function.
This PR makes all functions return union sets of the actual errors
they can return.
The error sets themselves are all limited to a single error.
Larger sets are useful for platform-specific APIs, but we don't have
any of these in `std/crypto`, and I couldn't find any meaningful way
to build larger sets.
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This ensures that errors are used consistently across all operations.
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std.crypto.random
* cross platform, even freestanding
* can't fail. on initialization for some systems requires calling
os.getrandom(), in which case there are rare but theoretically
possible errors. The code panics in these cases, however the
application may choose to override the default seed function and then
handle the failure another way.
* thread-safe
* supports the full Random interface
* cryptographically secure
* no syscall required to initialize on Linux (AT_RANDOM)
* calls arc4random on systems that support it
`std.crypto.randomBytes` is removed in favor of `std.crypto.random.bytes`.
I moved some of the Random implementations into their own files in the
interest of organization.
stage2 no longer requires passing a RNG; instead it uses this API.
Closes #6704
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This is a trivial implementation that just does a or[xor] loop.
However, this pattern is used by virtually all crypto libraries and
in practice, even without assembly barriers, LLVM never turns it into
code with conditional jumps, even if one of the parameters is constant.
This has been verified to still be the case with LLVM 11.0.0.
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The bcrypt function intentionally requires quite a lot of CPU cycles
to complete.
In addition to that, not having its full state constantly in the
CPU L1 cache causes a massive performance drop.
These properties slow down brute-force attacks against low-entropy
inputs (typically passwords), and GPU-based attacks get little
to no advantages over CPUs.
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