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Diffstat (limited to 'lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/x509_crt.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/x509_crt.c3401
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diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/x509_crt.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/x509_crt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index acdd545..0000000
--- a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/x509_crt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3401 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * X.509 certificate parsing and verification
- *
- * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-/*
- * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI.
- *
- * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs)
- * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs)
- * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10)
- *
- * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf
- * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
- *
- * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf
- */
-
-#include "common.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
-
-#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
-#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
-#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#else
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#define mbedtls_free free
-#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
-#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
-#include <windows.h>
-#else
-#include <time.h>
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
-#include <stdio.h>
-#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32)
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <dirent.h>
-#endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
- */
-typedef struct {
- mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
- uint32_t flags;
-} x509_crt_verify_chain_item;
-
-/*
- * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
- */
-#define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 )
-
-/* Default profile. Do not remove items unless there are serious security
- * concerns. */
-const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default =
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES)
- /* Allow SHA-1 (weak, but still safe in controlled environments) */
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) |
-#endif
- /* Only SHA-2 hashes */
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ),
- 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */
- 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */
- 2048,
-};
-
-/*
- * Next-default profile
- */
-const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next =
-{
- /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ),
- 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ),
-#else
- 0,
-#endif
- 2048,
-};
-
-/*
- * NSA Suite B Profile
- */
-const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb =
-{
- /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ),
- /* Only ECDSA */
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ),
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) |
- MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ),
-#else
- 0,
-#endif
- 0,
-};
-
-/*
- * Check md_alg against profile
- * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
- */
-static int x509_profile_check_md_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
-{
- if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
- return( -1 );
-
- if( ( profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( md_alg ) ) != 0 )
- return( 0 );
-
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Check pk_alg against profile
- * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
- */
-static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
- mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg )
-{
- if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
- return( -1 );
-
- if( ( profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( pk_alg ) ) != 0 )
- return( 0 );
-
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Check key against profile
- * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
- */
-static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
- const mbedtls_pk_context *pk )
-{
- const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
- if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
- {
- if( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( pk ) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen )
- return( 0 );
-
- return( -1 );
- }
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ||
- pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
- pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH )
- {
- const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id;
-
- if( gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )
- return( -1 );
-
- if( ( profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( gid ) ) != 0 )
- return( 0 );
-
- return( -1 );
- }
-#endif
-
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different
- */
-static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len )
-{
- size_t i;
- unsigned char diff;
- const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2;
-
- for( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
- {
- diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i];
-
- if( diff == 0 )
- continue;
-
- if( diff == 32 &&
- ( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) ||
- ( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
-
- return( -1 );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise
- */
-static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name )
-{
- size_t i;
- size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn );
-
- /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */
- if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' )
- return( -1 );
-
- for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i )
- {
- if( cn[i] == '.' )
- {
- cn_idx = i;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if( cn_idx == 0 )
- return( -1 );
-
- if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&
- x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding
- * variations (but not all).
- *
- * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
- */
-static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b )
-{
- if( a->tag == b->tag &&
- a->len == b->len &&
- memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
- ( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
- a->len == b->len &&
- x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).
- *
- * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:
- * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,
- * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation
- * or space folding.)
- *
- * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
- */
-static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b )
-{
- /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
- while( a != NULL || b != NULL )
- {
- if( a == NULL || b == NULL )
- return( -1 );
-
- /* type */
- if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||
- a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||
- memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 )
- {
- return( -1 );
- }
-
- /* value */
- if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 )
- return( -1 );
-
- /* structure of the list of sets */
- if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged )
- return( -1 );
-
- a = a->next;
- b = b->next;
- }
-
- /* a == NULL == b */
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain
- */
-static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(
- mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain )
-{
- size_t i;
-
- for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ )
- {
- ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL;
- ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1;
- }
-
- ver_chain->len = 0;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
- ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-}
-
-/*
- * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
- */
-static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- int *ver )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )
- {
- *ver = 0;
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) );
- }
-
- end = *p + len;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) );
-
- if( *p != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
- * notBefore Time,
- * notAfter Time }
- */
-static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- mbedtls_x509_time *from,
- mbedtls_x509_time *to )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) );
-
- end = *p + len;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, from ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, to ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- if( *p != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed)
- */
-static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- if( *p == end )
- return( 0 );
-
- uid->tag = **p;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &uid->len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | n ) ) != 0 )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )
- return( 0 );
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) );
- }
-
- uid->p = *p;
- *p += uid->len;
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- int *ca_istrue,
- int *max_pathlen )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len;
-
- /*
- * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
- * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
- * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
- */
- *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
- *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( *p == end )
- return( 0 );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end, ca_istrue ) ) != 0 )
- {
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )
- ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ca_istrue );
-
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( *ca_istrue != 0 )
- *ca_istrue = 1;
- }
-
- if( *p == end )
- return( 0 );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, max_pathlen ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( *p != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer
- * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */
- if( *max_pathlen == INT_MAX )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) );
-
- (*max_pathlen)++;
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- unsigned char *ns_cert_type)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( bs.len != 1 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) );
-
- /* Get actual bitstring */
- *ns_cert_type = *bs.p;
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int x509_get_key_usage( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- unsigned int *key_usage)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t i;
- mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( bs.len < 1 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) );
-
- /* Get actual bitstring */
- *key_usage = 0;
- for( i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof( unsigned int ); i++ )
- {
- *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i);
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
- *
- * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
- */
-static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */
- if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
- *
- * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
- *
- * GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
- * otherName [0] OtherName,
- * rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
- * dNSName [2] IA5String,
- * x400Address [3] ORAddress,
- * directoryName [4] Name,
- * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
- * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
- * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
- * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
- *
- * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
- *
- * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
- * partyName [1] DirectoryString }
- *
- * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName
- * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point.
- */
-static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len, tag_len;
- mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;
- unsigned char tag;
- mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
-
- /* Get main sequence tag */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( *p + len != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- while( *p < end )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf;
- memset( &dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof( dummy_san_buf ) );
-
- tag = **p;
- (*p)++;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) !=
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) );
- }
-
- /*
- * Check that the SAN is structured correctly.
- */
- ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf );
- /*
- * In case the extension is malformed, return an error,
- * and clear the allocated sequences.
- */
- if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next;
- mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv;
- while( seq_cur != NULL )
- {
- seq_prv = seq_cur;
- seq_cur = seq_cur->next;
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv,
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) );
- mbedtls_free( seq_prv );
- }
- subject_alt_name->next = NULL;
- return( ret );
- }
-
- /* Allocate and assign next pointer */
- if( cur->buf.p != NULL )
- {
- if( cur->next != NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS );
-
- cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) );
-
- if( cur->next == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) );
-
- cur = cur->next;
- }
-
- buf = &(cur->buf);
- buf->tag = tag;
- buf->p = *p;
- buf->len = tag_len;
- *p += buf->len;
- }
-
- /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
- cur->next = NULL;
-
- if( *p != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
- *
- * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
- *
- * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
- *
- * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
- * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,
- * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
- * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
- *
- * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
- *
- * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,
- * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
- *
- * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
- *
- * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }
- * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 }
- * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 }
- *
- * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
- *
- * Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
- * cPSuri CPSuri,
- * userNotice UserNotice }
- *
- * CPSuri ::= IA5String
- *
- * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
- * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
- * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL }
- *
- * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
- * organization DisplayText,
- * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
- *
- * DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
- * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)),
- * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
- * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
- * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
- *
- * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point
- * as defined in RFC 5280.
- */
-static int x509_get_certificate_policies( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies )
-{
- int ret, parse_ret = 0;
- size_t len;
- mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;
- mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies;
-
- /* Get main sequence tag */
- ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( *p + len != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- /*
- * Cannot be an empty sequence.
- */
- if( len == 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- while( *p < end )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid;
- const unsigned char *policy_end;
-
- /*
- * Get the policy sequence
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- policy_end = *p + len;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
- policy_oid.len = len;
- policy_oid.p = *p;
-
- /*
- * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy.
- */
- if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid ) != 0 )
- {
- /*
- * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this
- * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
- * is configured.
- */
- parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
- }
-
- /* Allocate and assign next pointer */
- if( cur->buf.p != NULL )
- {
- if( cur->next != NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS );
-
- cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) );
-
- if( cur->next == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) );
-
- cur = cur->next;
- }
-
- buf = &( cur->buf );
- buf->tag = policy_oid.tag;
- buf->p = policy_oid.p;
- buf->len = policy_oid.len;
-
- *p += len;
-
- /*
- * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end
- * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end.
- */
- if( *p < policy_end )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
- /*
- * Skip the optional policy qualifiers.
- */
- *p += len;
- }
-
- if( *p != policy_end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
- }
-
- /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
- cur->next = NULL;
-
- if( *p != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- return( parse_ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * X.509 v3 extensions
- *
- */
-static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
- void *p_ctx )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len;
- unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet;
-
- if( *p == end )
- return( 0 );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3 ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len;
- while( *p < end )
- {
- /*
- * Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
- * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
- * extnValue OCTET STRING }
- */
- mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = {0, 0, NULL};
- int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
- int ext_type = 0;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- end_ext_data = *p + len;
-
- /* Get extension ID */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
- extn_oid.p = *p;
- *p += extn_oid.len;
-
- /* Get optional critical */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 &&
- ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- /* Data should be octet string type */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- start_ext_octet = *p;
- end_ext_octet = *p + len;
-
- if( end_ext_octet != end_ext_data )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- /*
- * Detect supported extensions
- */
- ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type );
-
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */
- if( cb != NULL )
- {
- ret = cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet );
- if( ret != 0 && is_critical )
- return( ret );
- *p = end_ext_octet;
- continue;
- }
-
- /* No parser found, skip extension */
- *p = end_ext_octet;
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)
- if( is_critical )
- {
- /* Data is marked as critical: fail */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) );
- }
-#endif
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Forbid repeated extensions */
- if( ( crt->ext_types & ext_type ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS );
-
- crt->ext_types |= ext_type;
-
- switch( ext_type )
- {
- case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS:
- /* Parse basic constraints */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- break;
-
- case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE:
- /* Parse key usage */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- break;
-
- case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE:
- /* Parse extended key usage */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- break;
-
- case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
- /* Parse subject alt name */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- break;
-
- case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE:
- /* Parse netscape certificate type */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- break;
-
- case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES:
- /* Parse certificate policies type */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_certificate_policies( p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 )
- {
- /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension
- * if it contains unsupported policies */
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL &&
- cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical,
- start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet ) == 0 )
- break;
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)
- if( is_critical )
- return( ret );
- else
-#endif
- /*
- * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we
- * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to
- * the user to choose how to enforce the policies,
- * unless the extension is critical.
- */
- if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
- return( ret );
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- /*
- * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer
- * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it,
- * skip the extension.
- */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)
- if( is_critical )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
- else
-#endif
- *p = end_ext_octet;
- }
- }
-
- if( *p != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format
- */
-static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen,
- int make_copy,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
- void *p_ctx )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len;
- unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end;
- mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2;
-
- memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );
- memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );
- memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );
-
- /*
- * Check for valid input
- */
- if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */
- p = (unsigned char*) buf;
- len = buflen;
- end = p + len;
-
- /*
- * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
- * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
- * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
- * signatureValue BIT STRING }
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT );
- }
-
- end = crt_end = p + len;
- crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;
- if( make_copy != 0 )
- {
- /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */
- crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len );
- if( crt->raw.p == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
-
- memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len );
- crt->own_buffer = 1;
-
- p += crt->raw.len - len;
- end = crt_end = p + len;
- }
- else
- {
- crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf;
- crt->own_buffer = 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
- */
- crt->tbs.p = p;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) );
- }
-
- end = p + len;
- crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p;
-
- /*
- * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
- *
- * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
- *
- * signature AlgorithmIdentifier
- */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_version( &p, end, &crt->version ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( &p, end, &crt->serial ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crt->sig_oid,
- &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION );
- }
-
- crt->version++;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1,
- &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk,
- &crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- /*
- * issuer Name
- */
- crt->issuer_raw.p = p;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) );
- }
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p;
-
- /*
- * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
- * notBefore Time,
- * notAfter Time }
- *
- */
- if( ( ret = x509_get_dates( &p, end, &crt->valid_from,
- &crt->valid_to ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- /*
- * subject Name
- */
- crt->subject_raw.p = p;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) );
- }
-
- if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p;
-
- /*
- * SubjectPublicKeyInfo
- */
- crt->pk_raw.p = p;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
- crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p;
-
- /*
- * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
- * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
- * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
- * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
- * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
- * -- If present, version shall be v3
- */
- if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 )
- {
- ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1 );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 )
- {
- ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2 );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)
- if( crt->version == 3 )
-#endif
- {
- ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
-
- if( p != end )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
- }
-
- end = crt_end;
-
- /*
- * }
- * -- end of TBSCertificate
- *
- * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
- * signatureValue BIT STRING
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len ||
- memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 ||
- sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag ||
- sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len ||
- ( sig_params1.len != 0 &&
- memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH );
- }
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crt->sig ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( p != end )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a
- * chained list
- */
-static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen,
- int make_copy,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
- void *p_ctx )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Check for valid input
- */
- if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- while( crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL )
- {
- prev = crt;
- crt = crt->next;
- }
-
- /*
- * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed.
- */
- if( crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL )
- {
- crt->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
-
- if( crt->next == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
-
- prev = crt;
- mbedtls_x509_crt_init( crt->next );
- crt = crt->next;
- }
-
- ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- if( prev )
- prev->next = NULL;
-
- if( crt != chain )
- mbedtls_free( crt );
-
- return( ret );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen )
-{
- return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL ) );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen,
- int make_copy,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
- void *p_ctx )
-{
- return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ) );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen )
-{
- return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained
- * list
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t buflen )
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
- int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0;
- int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER;
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Check for valid input
- */
- if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- /*
- * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or
- * one or more PEM certificates.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
- if( buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' &&
- strstr( (const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ) != NULL )
- {
- buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM;
- }
-
- if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER )
- return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen );
-#else
- return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen );
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
- if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM )
- {
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_pem_context pem;
-
- /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */
- while( buflen > 1 )
- {
- size_t use_len;
- mbedtls_pem_init( &pem );
-
- /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */
- ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem,
- "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",
- "-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
- buf, NULL, 0, &use_len );
-
- if( ret == 0 )
- {
- /*
- * Was PEM encoded
- */
- buflen -= use_len;
- buf += use_len;
- }
- else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
- else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT )
- {
- mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );
-
- /*
- * PEM header and footer were found
- */
- buflen -= use_len;
- buf += use_len;
-
- if( first_error == 0 )
- first_error = ret;
-
- total_failed++;
- continue;
- }
- else
- break;
-
- ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen );
-
- mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );
-
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- /*
- * Quit parsing on a memory error
- */
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED )
- return( ret );
-
- if( first_error == 0 )
- first_error = ret;
-
- total_failed++;
- continue;
- }
-
- success = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if( success )
- return( total_failed );
- else if( first_error )
- return( first_error );
- else
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
-/*
- * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t n;
- unsigned char *buf;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( chain, buf, n );
-
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n );
- mbedtls_free( buf );
-
- return( ret );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
-{
- int ret = 0;
-#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
- int w_ret;
- WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH];
- char filename[MAX_PATH];
- char *p;
- size_t len = strlen( path );
-
- WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;
- HANDLE hFind;
-
- if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- memset( szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir) );
- memset( filename, 0, MAX_PATH );
- memcpy( filename, path, len );
- filename[len++] = '\\';
- p = filename + len;
- filename[len++] = '*';
-
- w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir,
- MAX_PATH - 3 );
- if( w_ret == 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- hFind = FindFirstFileW( szDir, &file_data );
- if( hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-
- len = MAX_PATH - len;
- do
- {
- memset( p, 0, len );
-
- if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY )
- continue;
-
- w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,
- lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ),
- p, (int) len - 1,
- NULL, NULL );
- if( w_ret == 0 )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, filename );
- if( w_ret < 0 )
- ret++;
- else
- ret += w_ret;
- }
- while( FindNextFileW( hFind, &file_data ) != 0 );
-
- if( GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-
-cleanup:
- FindClose( hFind );
-#else /* _WIN32 */
- int t_ret;
- int snp_ret;
- struct stat sb;
- struct dirent *entry;
- char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN];
- DIR *dir = opendir( path );
-
- if( dir == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) ) != 0 )
- {
- closedir( dir );
- return( ret );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
-
- memset( &sb, 0, sizeof( sb ) );
-
- while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL )
- {
- snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name,
- "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name );
-
- if( snp_ret < 0 || (size_t)snp_ret >= sizeof entry_name )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- else if( stat( entry_name, &sb ) == -1 )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- if( !S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) )
- continue;
-
- // Ignore parse errors
- //
- t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, entry_name );
- if( t_ret < 0 )
- ret++;
- else
- ret += t_ret;
- }
-
-cleanup:
- closedir( dir );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) != 0 )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
-
-#endif /* _WIN32 */
-
- return( ret );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
-
-/*
- * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
- *
- * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
- *
- * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName,
- * as defined in RFC 4108.
- */
-static int x509_get_other_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name,
- mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name )
-{
- int ret = 0;
- size_t len;
- unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p;
- const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len;
- mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid;
-
- if( ( subject_alt_name->tag &
- ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) !=
- ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ) )
- {
- /*
- * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername".
- */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- }
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
- cur_oid.p = p;
- cur_oid.len = len;
-
- /*
- * Only HwModuleName is currently supported.
- */
- if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid ) != 0 )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
- }
-
- if( p + len >= end )
- {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
- }
- p += len;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p;
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len;
-
- if( p + len >= end )
- {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
- }
- p += len;
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
-
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p;
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len;
- p += len;
- if( p != end )
- {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name,
- sizeof( *other_name ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
- }
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size,
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence
- *subject_alt_name,
- const char *prefix )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t n = *size;
- char *p = *buf;
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
- mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san;
- int parse_ret;
-
- while( cur != NULL )
- {
- memset( &san, 0, sizeof( san ) );
- parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &cur->buf, &san );
- if( parse_ret != 0 )
- {
- if( parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- }
- else
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <malformed>", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- }
- cur = cur->next;
- continue;
- }
-
- switch( san.type )
- {
- /*
- * otherName
- */
- case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME:
- {
- mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME,
- &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ) != 0 )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( p, n, &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if( other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len >= n )
- {
- *p = '\0';
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
- }
-
- memcpy( p, other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p,
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len );
- p += other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len;
-
- n -= other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len;
-
- }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */
- }
- break;
-
- /*
- * dNSName
- */
- case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME:
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- if( san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n )
- {
- *p = '\0';
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
- }
-
- memcpy( p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len );
- p += san.san.unstructured_name.len;
- n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len;
- }
- break;
-
- /*
- * Type not supported, skip item.
- */
- default:
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- break;
- }
-
- cur = cur->next;
- }
-
- *p = '\0';
-
- *size = n;
- *buf = p;
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
- mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- switch( san_buf->tag &
- ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK |
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) )
- {
- /*
- * otherName
- */
- case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ):
- {
- mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name;
-
- ret = x509_get_other_name( san_buf, &other_name );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) );
- san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME;
- memcpy( &san->san.other_name,
- &other_name, sizeof( other_name ) );
-
- }
- break;
-
- /*
- * dNSName
- */
- case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ):
- {
- memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) );
- san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME;
-
- memcpy( &san->san.unstructured_name,
- san_buf, sizeof( *san_buf ) );
-
- }
- break;
-
- /*
- * Type not supported
- */
- default:
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
- }
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \
- { \
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \
- sep = ", "; \
- }
-
-#define CERT_TYPE(type,name) \
- if( ns_cert_type & (type) ) \
- PRINT_ITEM( name );
-
-static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size,
- unsigned char ns_cert_type )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t n = *size;
- char *p = *buf;
- const char *sep = "";
-
- CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client" );
- CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server" );
- CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email" );
- CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing" );
- CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved" );
- CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA" );
- CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA" );
- CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA" );
-
- *size = n;
- *buf = p;
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#define KEY_USAGE(code,name) \
- if( key_usage & (code) ) \
- PRINT_ITEM( name );
-
-static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size,
- unsigned int key_usage )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t n = *size;
- char *p = *buf;
- const char *sep = "";
-
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature" );
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation" );
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment" );
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment" );
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement" );
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign" );
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign" );
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only" );
- KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only" );
-
- *size = n;
- *buf = p;
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size,
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- const char *desc;
- size_t n = *size;
- char *p = *buf;
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage;
- const char *sep = "";
-
- while( cur != NULL )
- {
- if( mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 )
- desc = "???";
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- sep = ", ";
-
- cur = cur->next;
- }
-
- *size = n;
- *buf = p;
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-static int x509_info_cert_policies( char **buf, size_t *size,
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- const char *desc;
- size_t n = *size;
- char *p = *buf;
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies;
- const char *sep = "";
-
- while( cur != NULL )
- {
- if( mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 )
- desc = "???";
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- sep = ", ";
-
- cur = cur->next;
- }
-
- *size = n;
- *buf = p;
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Return an informational string about the certificate.
- */
-#define BEFORE_COLON 18
-#define BC "18"
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t n;
- char *p;
- char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON];
-
- p = buf;
- n = size;
-
- if( NULL == crt )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n" );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- return( (int) ( size - n ) );
- }
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n",
- prefix, crt->version );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sserial number : ",
- prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &crt->serial );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->issuer );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->subject );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \
- "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,
- crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon,
- crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour,
- crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \
- "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,
- crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon,
- crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour,
- crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk,
- crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- /* Key size */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON,
- mbedtls_pk_get_name( &crt->pk ) ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str,
- (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &crt->pk ) );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- /*
- * Optional extensions
- */
-
- if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix,
- crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false" );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if( crt->max_pathlen > 0 )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1 );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- }
- }
-
- if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if( ( ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name( &p, &n,
- &crt->subject_alt_names,
- prefix ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_type( &p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if( ( ret = x509_info_key_usage( &p, &n, crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if( ( ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage( &p, &n,
- &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_policies( &p, &n,
- &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- }
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- return( (int) ( size - n ) );
-}
-
-struct x509_crt_verify_string {
- int code;
- const char *string;
-};
-
-static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = {
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, "The certificate validity has expired" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, "The CRL is expired" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, "Certificate was missing" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, "Certificate verification was skipped" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, "The certificate validity starts in the future" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, "The CRL is from the future" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." },
- { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
- uint32_t flags )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur;
- char *p = buf;
- size_t n = size;
-
- for( cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL ; cur++ )
- {
- if( ( flags & cur->code ) == 0 )
- continue;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- flags ^= cur->code;
- }
-
- if( flags != 0 )
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sUnknown reason "
- "(this should not happen)\n", prefix );
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- }
-
- return( (int) ( size - n ) );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- unsigned int usage )
-{
- unsigned int usage_must, usage_may;
- unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY
- | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY;
-
- if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 )
- return( 0 );
-
- usage_must = usage & ~may_mask;
-
- if( ( ( crt->key_usage & ~may_mask ) & usage_must ) != usage_must )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- usage_may = usage & may_mask;
-
- if( ( ( crt->key_usage & may_mask ) | usage_may ) != usage_may )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- const char *usage_oid,
- size_t usage_len )
-{
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur;
-
- /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */
- if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 )
- return( 0 );
-
- /*
- * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list
- */
- for( cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
- {
- const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf;
-
- if( cur_oid->len == usage_len &&
- memcmp( cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid ) == 0 )
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
-/*
- * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise.
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl )
-{
- const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry;
-
- while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 )
- {
- if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len &&
- memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 1 );
- }
-
- cur = cur->next;
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL.
- * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present.
- */
-static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
- mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile )
-{
- int flags = 0;
- unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
- const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
-
- if( ca == NULL )
- return( flags );
-
- while( crl_list != NULL )
- {
- if( crl_list->version == 0 ||
- x509_name_cmp( &crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject ) != 0 )
- {
- crl_list = crl_list->next;
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
- if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca,
- MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 )
- {
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
- break;
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA
- */
- if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_md ) != 0 )
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD;
-
- if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_pk ) != 0 )
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK;
-
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md );
- if( mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
- {
- /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
- break;
- }
-
- if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &ca->pk ) != 0 )
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-
- if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk,
- crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
- crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 )
- {
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out)
- */
- if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crl_list->next_update ) )
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED;
-
- if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crl_list->this_update ) )
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE;
-
- /*
- * Check if certificate is revoked
- */
- if( mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( crt, crl_list ) )
- {
- flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED;
- break;
- }
-
- crl_list = crl_list->next;
- }
-
- return( flags );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
-
-/*
- * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
- unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
- size_t hash_len;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
- const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
- hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
-
- /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */
- if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
- return( -1 );
-#else
- psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md );
-
- if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( -1 );
-
- if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len )
- != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- return( -1 );
- }
-
- if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len )
- != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- return( -1 );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
- /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
- if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) )
- return( -1 );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA )
- {
- return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk,
- child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
- child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) );
- }
-#else
- (void) rs_ctx;
-#endif
-
- return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
- child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
- child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'.
- * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not.
- *
- * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
- int top )
-{
- int need_ca_bit;
-
- /* Parent must be the issuer */
- if( x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &parent->subject ) != 0 )
- return( -1 );
-
- /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */
- need_ca_bit = 1;
-
- /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */
- if( top && parent->version < 3 )
- need_ca_bit = 0;
-
- if( need_ca_bit && ! parent->ca_istrue )
- return( -1 );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
- if( need_ca_bit &&
- mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN ) != 0 )
- {
- return( -1 );
- }
-#endif
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL.
- *
- * Here suitable is defined as:
- * 1. subject name matches child's issuer
- * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs
- * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct
- * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported)
- * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied
- *
- * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first
- * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is
- * none).
- *
- * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted
- * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods.
- * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.)
- * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is
- * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that
- * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here.
- *
- * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might
- * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the
- * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't
- * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to
- * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].)
- *
- * Arguments:
- * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent
- * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents
- * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL)
- * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
- * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top
- * of the chain, 0 otherwise
- * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far
- * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far
- * (will never be greater than path_cnt)
- * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
- *
- * Return value:
- * - 0 on success
- * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
- */
-static int x509_crt_find_parent_in(
- mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,
- mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent,
- int *r_signature_is_good,
- int top,
- unsigned path_cnt,
- unsigned self_cnt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent;
- int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- /* did we have something in progress? */
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL )
- {
- /* restore saved state */
- parent = rs_ctx->parent;
- fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent;
- fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good;
-
- /* clear saved state */
- rs_ctx->parent = NULL;
- rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
- rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
-
- /* resume where we left */
- goto check_signature;
- }
-#endif
-
- fallback_parent = NULL;
- fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
-
- for( parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
- {
- /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */
- if( x509_crt_check_parent( child, parent, top ) != 0 )
- continue;
-
- /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */
- if( parent->max_pathlen > 0 &&
- (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt )
- {
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Signature */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-check_signature:
-#endif
- ret = x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent, rs_ctx );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
- {
- /* save state */
- rs_ctx->parent = parent;
- rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent;
- rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
-
- return( ret );
- }
-#else
- (void) ret;
-#endif
-
- signature_is_good = ret == 0;
- if( top && ! signature_is_good )
- continue;
-
- /* optional time check */
- if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &parent->valid_to ) ||
- mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &parent->valid_from ) )
- {
- if( fallback_parent == NULL )
- {
- fallback_parent = parent;
- fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
- }
-
- continue;
- }
-
- *r_parent = parent;
- *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
-
- break;
- }
-
- if( parent == NULL )
- {
- *r_parent = fallback_parent;
- *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL.
- *
- * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found
- * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable).
- *
- * Arguments:
- * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed
- * by a chain of possible intermediates
- * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates
- * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL)
- * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0
- * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
- * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child)
- * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far
- * (will always be no greater than path_cnt)
- * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
- *
- * Return value:
- * - 0 on success
- * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
- */
-static int x509_crt_find_parent(
- mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
- mbedtls_x509_crt **parent,
- int *parent_is_trusted,
- int *signature_is_good,
- unsigned path_cnt,
- unsigned self_cnt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list;
-
- *parent_is_trusted = 1;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1 )
- {
- *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted;
- rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
- }
-#endif
-
- while( 1 ) {
- search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next;
-
- ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list,
- parent, signature_is_good,
- *parent_is_trusted,
- path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
- {
- /* save state */
- rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted;
- return( ret );
- }
-#else
- (void) ret;
-#endif
-
- /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */
- if( *parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0 )
- break;
-
- /* prepare second iteration */
- *parent_is_trusted = 0;
- }
-
- /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */
- if( *parent == NULL )
- {
- *parent_is_trusted = 0;
- *signature_is_good = 0;
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted
- *
- * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only
- * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked)
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
- mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca )
-{
- mbedtls_x509_crt *cur;
-
- /* must be self-issued */
- if( x509_name_cmp( &crt->issuer, &crt->subject ) != 0 )
- return( -1 );
-
- /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */
- for( cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
- {
- if( crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len &&
- memcmp( crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
- }
-
- /* too bad */
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Build and verify a certificate chain
- *
- * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and
- * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain
- * EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj]
- * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one,
- * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible.
- *
- * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found.
- *
- * Special cases:
- * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it
- * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root
- * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq
- *
- * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least:
- * - trusted EE
- * - EE -> trusted root
- * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root
- * - if relevant: EE untrusted
- * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted
- * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root).
- * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is
- * enough (but length 1 is not in general).
- *
- * Arguments:
- * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn
- * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp
- * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
- * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain
- * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise!
- * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume.
- * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
- *
- * Return value:
- * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined
- * - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined,
- * even if it was found to be invalid
- */
-static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
- mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
- mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
- void *p_ca_cb,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
- /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can
- * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- uint32_t *flags;
- mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
- mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
- mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
- int parent_is_trusted;
- int child_is_trusted;
- int signature_is_good;
- unsigned self_cnt;
- mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- /* resume if we had an operation in progress */
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent )
- {
- /* restore saved state */
- *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */
- self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt;
-
- /* restore derived state */
- cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1];
- child = cur->crt;
- flags = &cur->flags;
-
- goto find_parent;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
- child = crt;
- self_cnt = 0;
- parent_is_trusted = 0;
- child_is_trusted = 0;
-
- while( 1 ) {
- /* Add certificate to the verification chain */
- cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len];
- cur->crt = child;
- cur->flags = 0;
- ver_chain->len++;
- flags = &cur->flags;
-
- /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
- if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
-
- if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
-
- /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */
- if( child_is_trusted )
- return( 0 );
-
- /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */
- if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
-
- if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 )
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
-
- /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
- if( ver_chain->len == 1 &&
- x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-find_parent:
-#endif
-
- /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback,
- * or use statically provided list. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
- if( f_ca_cb != NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result );
- mbedtls_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result );
- ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
-
- ret = f_ca_cb( p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
-
- cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
- {
- ((void) f_ca_cb);
- ((void) p_ca_cb);
- cur_trust_ca = trust_ca;
- }
-
- /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
- ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, cur_trust_ca, &parent,
- &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good,
- ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
- {
- /* save state */
- rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent;
- rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt;
- rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */
-
- return( ret );
- }
-#else
- (void) ret;
-#endif
-
- /* No parent? We're done here */
- if( parent == NULL )
- {
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
- * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
- * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
- if( ver_chain->len != 1 &&
- x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
- {
- self_cnt++;
- }
-
- /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
- * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
- if( ! parent_is_trusted &&
- ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
- {
- /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
- }
-
- /* signature was checked while searching parent */
- if( ! signature_is_good )
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
-
- /* check size of signing key */
- if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &parent->pk ) != 0 )
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
- /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
- *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl( child, parent, ca_crl, profile );
-#else
- (void) ca_crl;
-#endif
-
- /* prepare for next iteration */
- child = parent;
- parent = NULL;
- child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;
- signature_is_good = 0;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Check for CN match
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_cn( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name,
- const char *cn, size_t cn_len )
-{
- /* try exact match */
- if( name->len == cn_len &&
- x509_memcasecmp( cn, name->p, cn_len ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- /* try wildcard match */
- if( x509_check_wildcard( cn, name ) == 0 )
- {
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_san( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name,
- const char *cn, size_t cn_len )
-{
- const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) name->tag &
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK;
-
- /* dNSName */
- if( san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME )
- return( x509_crt_check_cn( name, cn, cn_len ) );
-
- /* (We may handle other types here later.) */
-
- /* Unrecognized type */
- return( -1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL!
- */
-static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- const char *cn,
- uint32_t *flags )
-{
- const mbedtls_x509_name *name;
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur;
- size_t cn_len = strlen( cn );
-
- if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME )
- {
- for( cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
- {
- if( x509_crt_check_san( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 )
- break;
- }
-
- if( cur == NULL )
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
- }
- else
- {
- for( name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next )
- {
- if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) == 0 &&
- x509_crt_check_cn( &name->val, cn, cn_len ) == 0 )
- {
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if( name == NULL )
- *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback
- */
-static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(
- uint32_t *flags,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
- int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
- void *p_vrfy )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- unsigned i;
- uint32_t cur_flags;
- const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
-
- for( i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i )
- {
- cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1];
- cur_flags = cur->flags;
-
- if( NULL != f_vrfy )
- if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- *flags |= cur_flags;
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version
- *
- * This function:
- * - checks the requested CN (if any)
- * - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,
- * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently
- * - builds and verifies the chain
- * - then calls the callback and merges the flags
- *
- * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb`
- * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the
- * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will
- * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list
- * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list
- * of CRLs.
- */
-static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
- mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
- void *p_ca_cb,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
- const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
- int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
- void *p_vrfy,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
- mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
- uint32_t ee_flags;
-
- *flags = 0;
- ee_flags = 0;
- x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ver_chain );
-
- if( profile == NULL )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- goto exit;
- }
-
- /* check name if requested */
- if( cn != NULL )
- x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, &ee_flags );
-
- /* Check the type and size of the key */
- pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );
-
- if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )
- ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
-
- if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &crt->pk ) != 0 )
- ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-
- /* Check the chain */
- ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
- f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile,
- &ver_chain, rs_ctx );
-
- if( ret != 0 )
- goto exit;
-
- /* Merge end-entity flags */
- ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags;
-
- /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */
- ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
-
-exit:
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result );
- mbedtls_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result );
- ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
- mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx );
-#endif
-
- /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by
- * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the
- * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */
- if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
-
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- *flags = (uint32_t) -1;
- return( ret );
- }
-
- if( *flags != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable)
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
- mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
- const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
- int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
- void *p_vrfy )
-{
- return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
- NULL, NULL,
- &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default,
- cn, flags,
- f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable)
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
- mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
- const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
- int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
- void *p_vrfy )
-{
- return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
- NULL, NULL,
- profile, cn, flags,
- f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
-/*
- * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback,
- * not restartable).
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
- void *p_ca_cb,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
- const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
- int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
- void *p_vrfy )
-{
- return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, NULL, NULL,
- f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb,
- profile, cn, flags,
- f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
- mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
- mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
- const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
- const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
- int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
- void *p_vrfy,
- mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
- return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
- NULL, NULL,
- profile, cn, flags,
- f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ) );
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Initialize a certificate chain
- */
-void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
-{
- memset( crt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Unallocate all certificate data
- */
-void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
-{
- mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt;
- mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv;
- mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur;
- mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv;
- mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur;
- mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv;
-
- if( crt == NULL )
- return;
-
- do
- {
- mbedtls_pk_free( &cert_cur->pk );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
- mbedtls_free( cert_cur->sig_opts );
-#endif
-
- name_cur = cert_cur->issuer.next;
- while( name_cur != NULL )
- {
- name_prv = name_cur;
- name_cur = name_cur->next;
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );
- mbedtls_free( name_prv );
- }
-
- name_cur = cert_cur->subject.next;
- while( name_cur != NULL )
- {
- name_prv = name_cur;
- name_cur = name_cur->next;
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );
- mbedtls_free( name_prv );
- }
-
- seq_cur = cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next;
- while( seq_cur != NULL )
- {
- seq_prv = seq_cur;
- seq_cur = seq_cur->next;
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv,
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) );
- mbedtls_free( seq_prv );
- }
-
- seq_cur = cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next;
- while( seq_cur != NULL )
- {
- seq_prv = seq_cur;
- seq_cur = seq_cur->next;
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv,
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) );
- mbedtls_free( seq_prv );
- }
-
- seq_cur = cert_cur->certificate_policies.next;
- while( seq_cur != NULL )
- {
- seq_prv = seq_cur;
- seq_cur = seq_cur->next;
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv,
- sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) );
- mbedtls_free( seq_prv );
- }
-
- if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer )
- {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len );
- mbedtls_free( cert_cur->raw.p );
- }
-
- cert_cur = cert_cur->next;
- }
- while( cert_cur != NULL );
-
- cert_cur = crt;
- do
- {
- cert_prv = cert_cur;
- cert_cur = cert_cur->next;
-
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
- if( cert_prv != crt )
- mbedtls_free( cert_prv );
- }
- while( cert_cur != NULL );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-/*
- * Initialize a restart context
- */
-void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx )
-{
- mbedtls_pk_restart_init( &ctx->pk );
-
- ctx->parent = NULL;
- ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
- ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
-
- ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
-
- ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none;
- ctx->self_cnt = 0;
- x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ctx->ver_chain );
-}
-
-/*
- * Free the components of a restart context
- */
-void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx )
-{
- if( ctx == NULL )
- return;
-
- mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &ctx->pk );
- mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( ctx );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-22 03:11:16 +0000