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Diffstat (limited to 'lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/hmac_drbg.c')
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diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/hmac_drbg.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/hmac_drbg.c
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index 0000000..de97068
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+++ b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90)
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication.
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf
+ * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012).
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#else
+#include <stdio.h>
+#define mbedtls_printf printf
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG context initialization
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx )
+{
+ memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) );
+
+ ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2)
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional,
+ size_t add_len )
+{
+ size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info );
+ unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1;
+ unsigned char sep[1];
+ unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+ for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ )
+ {
+ /* Step 1 or 4 */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
+ ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
+ sep, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ if( rounds == 2 )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
+ additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Step 2 or 5 */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
+ ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K, sizeof( K ) );
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional,
+ size_t add_len )
+{
+ (void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+/*
+ * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA)
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Set initial working state.
+ * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the
+ * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value.
+ */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ memset( ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG.
+ * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4
+ * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2.
+ */
+static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len,
+ int use_nonce )
+{
+ unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
+ size_t seedlen = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ {
+ size_t total_entropy_len;
+
+ if( use_nonce == 0 )
+ total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len;
+ else
+ total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2;
+
+ /* III. Check input length */
+ if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ||
+ total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
+ }
+ }
+
+ memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
+
+ /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */
+ if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy,
+ seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
+ }
+ seedlen += ctx->entropy_len;
+
+ /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated
+ * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */
+ if( use_nonce )
+ {
+ /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order
+ * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy()
+ * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not
+ * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which
+ * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own
+ * entropy source implementation can emit in a single
+ * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */
+ if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy,
+ seed + seedlen,
+ ctx->entropy_len / 2 ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2;
+ }
+
+
+ /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */
+ if( additional != NULL && len != 0 )
+ {
+ memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len );
+ seedlen += len;
+ }
+
+ /* 2. Update state */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */
+ ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
+
+exit:
+ /* 4. Done */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen );
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 + 9.2
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len )
+{
+ return( hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1)
+ *
+ * The nonce is not passed as a separate parameter but extracted
+ * from the entropy source as suggested in 8.6.7.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info,
+ int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_entropy,
+ const unsigned char *custom,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t md_size;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
+#endif
+
+ md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+
+ /*
+ * Set initial working state.
+ * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the
+ * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value.
+ */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_size );
+
+ ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
+ ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy;
+
+ if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 )
+ {
+ /*
+ * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by
+ * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2,
+ * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength.
+ *
+ * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.)
+ */
+ ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */
+ md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */
+ 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */
+ }
+
+ if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, custom, len,
+ 1 /* add nonce */ ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set prediction resistance
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int resistance )
+{
+ ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set entropy length grabbed for seeding
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len )
+{
+ ctx->entropy_len = len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set reseed interval
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval )
+{
+ ctx->reseed_interval = interval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data:
+ * 10.1.2.5 (arabic) + 9.3 (Roman)
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng;
+ size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info );
+ size_t left = out_len;
+ unsigned char *out = output;
+
+ /* II. Check request length */
+ if( out_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG );
+
+ /* III. Check input length */
+ if( add_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
+
+ /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */
+ if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */
+ ( ctx->prediction_resistance == MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ||
+ ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ) )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */
+ }
+
+ /* 2. Use additional data if any */
+ if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx,
+ additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */
+ while( left != 0 )
+ {
+ size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
+ ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+ memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len );
+ out += use_len;
+ left -= use_len;
+ }
+
+ /* 6. Update */
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx,
+ additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* 7. Update reseed counter */
+ ctx->reseed_counter++;
+
+exit:
+ /* 8. Done */
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG random function
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+#endif
+
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, out_len, NULL, 0 );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
+#endif
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately
+ * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init().
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx )
+{
+ if( ctx == NULL )
+ return;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */
+ if( ctx->md_ctx.md_info != NULL )
+ mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex );
+#endif
+ mbedtls_md_free( &ctx->md_ctx );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) );
+ ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ FILE *f;
+ unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
+
+ if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+ if( fwrite( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) != sizeof( buf ) )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ fclose( f );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ size_t n;
+ unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
+
+ n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f );
+ if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ fclose( f );
+ f = NULL;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+ if( f != NULL )
+ fclose( f );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+/* Dummy checkup routine */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose )
+{
+ (void) verbose;
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#else
+
+#define OUTPUT_LEN 80
+
+/* From a NIST PR=true test vector */
+static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = {
+ 0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f,
+ 0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11,
+ 0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42,
+ 0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3,
+ 0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4 };
+static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = {
+ 0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39,
+ 0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94,
+ 0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54,
+ 0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e,
+ 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab,
+ 0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3,
+ 0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44 };
+
+/* From a NIST PR=false test vector */
+static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = {
+ 0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66,
+ 0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8,
+ 0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3,
+ 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf };
+static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = {
+ 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f,
+ 0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6,
+ 0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a,
+ 0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec,
+ 0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd,
+ 0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49,
+ 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7 };
+
+/* "Entropy" from buffer */
+static size_t test_offset;
+static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = data;
+ memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len );
+ test_offset += len;
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \
+ { \
+ if( verbose != 0 ) \
+ mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \
+ return( 1 ); \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine for HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose )
+{
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN];
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 );
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx );
+
+ /*
+ * PR = True
+ */
+ if( verbose != 0 )
+ mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : " );
+
+ test_offset = 0;
+ CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info,
+ hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr,
+ NULL, 0 ) );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON );
+ CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
+ CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
+ CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx );
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx );
+
+ if( verbose != 0 )
+ mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
+
+ /*
+ * PR = False
+ */
+ if( verbose != 0 )
+ mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : " );
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx );
+
+ test_offset = 0;
+ CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info,
+ hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr,
+ NULL, 0 ) );
+ CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) );
+ CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
+ CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
+ CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx );
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx );
+
+ if( verbose != 0 )
+ mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
+
+ if( verbose != 0 )
+ mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-22 06:13:20 +0000