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authorAdam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com>2022-11-26 16:20:59 -0500
committerAdam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com>2022-11-29 18:39:46 -0500
commitfc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875 (patch)
tree6e7723c3f45d39f06c243d9c18a3c038da948793 /lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
parent3836606e2b735ba7b2dc0f580231843660587fb4 (diff)
downloadlite-xl-plugin-manager-fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875.tar.gz
lite-xl-plugin-manager-fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875.zip
Removed openssl, and curl, and added mbedded tls.curl-removal
Almost fully removed curl, needs more testing. Fixed most issues, now trying to cross compile. Fix? Sigh.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c349
1 files changed, 349 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
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+++ b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 key schedule
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
+#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \
+ .name = string,
+
+struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels =
+{
+ /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one
+ * character too long due to the 0-termination. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST
+};
+
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL
+
+/*
+ * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule.
+ *
+ * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows:
+ *
+ * struct HkdfLabel {
+ * uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material
+ * opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 "
+ * opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash
+ * };
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material
+ * Even though the standard allows expansion to up to
+ * 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than
+ * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most
+ * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by
+ * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes.
+ * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix
+ * The label length MUST be less than or equal to
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN
+ * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
+ * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3
+ * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN().
+ * - (ctx, clen): context + context length
+ * The context length MUST be less than or equal to
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN
+ * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this.
+ * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure,
+ * This MUST be a writable buffer of size
+ * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes.
+ * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of
+ * the HkdfLabel structure on success.
+ */
+
+static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 ";
+
+#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( label_len, context_len ) \
+ ( 2 /* expansion length */ \
+ + 1 /* label length */ \
+ + label_len \
+ + 1 /* context length */ \
+ + context_len )
+
+#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \
+ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \
+ sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN )
+
+static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label(
+ size_t desired_length,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
+ unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen )
+{
+ size_t total_label_len =
+ sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen;
+ size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len =
+ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( total_label_len, clen );
+
+ unsigned char *p = dst;
+
+ /* Add the size of the expanded key material.
+ * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use
+ * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */
+#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255
+#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \
+ value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN"
+#endif
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( desired_length >> 0 ) & 0xFF );
+
+ /* Add label incl. prefix */
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( total_label_len & 0xFF );
+ memcpy( p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) );
+ p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix);
+ memcpy( p, label, llen );
+ p += llen;
+
+ /* Add context value */
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( clen & 0xFF );
+ if( clen != 0 )
+ memcpy( p, ctx, clen );
+
+ /* Return total length to the caller. */
+ *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
+ const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen )
+{
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
+ unsigned char hkdf_label[ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN ];
+ size_t hkdf_label_len;
+
+ if( llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN )
+ {
+ /* Should never happen since this is an internal
+ * function, and we know statically which labels
+ * are allowed. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ if( clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN )
+ {
+ /* Should not happen, as above. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ if( blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN )
+ {
+ /* Should not happen, as above. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg );
+ if( md == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( blen,
+ label, llen,
+ ctx, clen,
+ hkdf_label,
+ &hkdf_label_len );
+
+ return( mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md,
+ secret, slen,
+ hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len,
+ buf, blen ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs:
+ *
+ * - One secret value per sender.
+ * - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
+ * - The desired lengths of key and IV.
+ *
+ * The expansion itself is based on HKDF:
+ *
+ * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length )
+ * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length )
+ *
+ * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided
+ * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side
+ * keys in a single function call.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
+ const unsigned char *client_secret,
+ const unsigned char *server_secret,
+ size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len,
+ mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
+ client_secret, slen,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ),
+ NULL, 0,
+ keys->client_write_key, key_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
+ server_secret, slen,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ),
+ NULL, 0,
+ keys->server_write_key, key_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
+ client_secret, slen,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ),
+ NULL, 0,
+ keys->client_write_iv, iv_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
+ server_secret, slen,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ),
+ NULL, 0,
+ keys->server_write_iv, iv_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ keys->key_len = key_len;
+ keys->iv_len = iv_len;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret(
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
+ const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen,
+ int ctx_hashed,
+ unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen )
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char hashed_context[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
+
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
+ md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg );
+ if( md == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ if( ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED )
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_md( md, ctx, clen, hashed_context );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ clen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if( clen > sizeof(hashed_context) )
+ {
+ /* This should never happen since this function is internal
+ * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly.
+ * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk
+ * of getting a stack overflow. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+
+ memcpy( hashed_context, ctx, clen );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
+ secret, slen,
+ label, llen,
+ hashed_context, clen,
+ dstbuf, buflen ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret(
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg,
+ const unsigned char *secret_old,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+ unsigned char *secret_new )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t hlen, ilen;
+ unsigned char tmp_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char tmp_input [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 };
+
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md;
+ md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg );
+ if( md == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md );
+
+ /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "")
+ * on the old secret. */
+ if( secret_old != NULL )
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret(
+ hash_alg,
+ secret_old, hlen,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( derived ),
+ NULL, 0, /* context */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED,
+ tmp_secret, hlen );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if( input != NULL )
+ {
+ memcpy( tmp_input, input, input_len );
+ ilen = input_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ilen = hlen;
+ }
+
+ /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material.
+ * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material
+ * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */
+ ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md,
+ tmp_secret, hlen,
+ tmp_input, ilen,
+ secret_new );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input) );
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */