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author | Adam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com> | 2022-11-26 16:20:59 -0500 |
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committer | Adam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com> | 2022-11-29 18:39:46 -0500 |
commit | fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875 (patch) | |
tree | 6e7723c3f45d39f06c243d9c18a3c038da948793 /lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecjpake.c | |
parent | 3836606e2b735ba7b2dc0f580231843660587fb4 (diff) | |
download | lite-xl-plugin-manager-fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875.tar.gz lite-xl-plugin-manager-fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875.zip |
Removed openssl, and curl, and added mbedded tls.curl-removal
Almost fully removed curl, needs more testing.
Fixed most issues, now trying to cross compile.
Fix?
Sigh.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecjpake.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecjpake.c | 1146 |
1 files changed, 1146 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecjpake.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecjpake.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..464ff51 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecjpake.c @@ -0,0 +1,1146 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve J-PAKE + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References in the code are to the Thread v1.0 Specification, + * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include <string.h> + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * Convert a mbedtls_ecjpake_role to identifier string + */ +static const char * const ecjpake_id[] = { + "client", + "server" +}; + +#define ID_MINE ( ecjpake_id[ ctx->role ] ) +#define ID_PEER ( ecjpake_id[ 1 - ctx->role ] ) + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_init( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp ); + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xm1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xm2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->xm1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->xm2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->s ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_free( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + ctx->md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xm1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xm2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->xm1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->xm2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->s ); +} + +/* + * Setup context + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT || + role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( secret != NULL || len == 0 ); + + ctx->role = role; + + if( ( ctx->md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, curve ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->s, secret, len ) ); + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check if context is ready for use + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_check( const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( ctx->md_info == NULL || + ctx->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + ctx->s.p == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Write a point plus its length to a buffer + */ +static int ecjpake_write_len_point( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Need at least 4 for length plus 1 for point */ + if( end < *p || end - *p < 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( grp, P, pf, + &len, *p + 4, end - ( *p + 4 ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + (*p)[0] = (unsigned char)( ( len >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + (*p)[1] = (unsigned char)( ( len >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + (*p)[2] = (unsigned char)( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + (*p)[3] = (unsigned char)( ( len ) & 0xFF ); + + *p += 4 + len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Size of the temporary buffer for ecjpake_hash: + * 3 EC points plus their length, plus ID and its length (4 + 6 bytes) + */ +#define ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN ( 3 * ( 4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ) + 4 + 6 ) + +/* + * Compute hash for ZKP (7.4.2.2.2.1) + */ +static int ecjpake_hash( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *V, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + mbedtls_mpi *h ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN]; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + sizeof( buf ); + const size_t id_len = strlen( id ); + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* Write things to temporary buffer */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, G ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, V ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, X ) ); + + if( end - p < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( id_len >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( id_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( id_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( id_len ) & 0xFF ); + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < id_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( p, id, id_len ); + p += id_len; + + /* Compute hash */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ) ); + + /* Turn it into an integer mod n */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( h, hash, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( h, h, &grp->N ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a ECShnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) and verify it (7.4.2.3.3) + */ +static int ecjpake_zkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + const unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point V, VV; + mbedtls_mpi r, h; + size_t r_len; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &V ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &VV ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECPoint V; + * opaque r<1..2^8-1>; + * } ECSchnorrZKP; + */ + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( grp, &V, p, end - *p ) ); + + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < 1 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + r_len = *(*p)++; + + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < r_len || r_len == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r, *p, r_len ) ); + *p += r_len; + + /* + * Verification + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_hash( md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, + &VV, &h, X, &r, G ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( &VV, &V ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &V ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &VV ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate ZKP (7.4.2.3.2) and write it as ECSchnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) + */ +static int ecjpake_zkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_mpi *x, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point V; + mbedtls_mpi v; + mbedtls_mpi h; /* later recycled to hold r */ + size_t len; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &V ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &v ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + + /* Compute signature */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, + G, &v, &V, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_hash( md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &h, &h, x ) ); /* x*h */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &h, &v, &h ) ); /* v - x*h */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &h, &h, &grp->N ) ); /* r */ + + /* Write it out */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( grp, &V, + pf, &len, *p, end - *p ) ); + *p += len; + + len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &h ); /* actually r */ + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < 1 + len || len > 255 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + *(*p)++ = (unsigned char)( len & 0xFF ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, *p, len ) ); /* r */ + *p += len; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &V ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &v ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a ECJPAKEKeyKP (7.4.2.2.1) and check proof + * Output: verified public key X + */ +static int ecjpake_kkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + const unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECPoint X; + * ECSchnorrZKP zkp; + * } ECJPAKEKeyKP; + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( grp, X, p, end - *p ) ); + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( X ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate an ECJPAKEKeyKP + * Output: the serialized structure, plus private/public key pair + */ +static int ecjpake_kkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *x, + mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Generate key (7.4.2.3.1) and write it out */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, x, X, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( grp, X, + pf, &len, *p, end - *p ) ); + *p += len; + + /* Generate and write proof */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, x, X, id, + p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs + * Ouputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb + */ +static int ecjpake_kkpp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb, + const char *id, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + /* + * struct { + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp_pair_list[2]; + * } ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList; + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end ) ); + + if( p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList + * Outputs: the serialized structure, plus two private/public key pairs + */ +static int ecjpake_kkpp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *xm1, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa, + mbedtls_mpi *xm2, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb, + const char *id, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read and process the first round message + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + return( ecjpake_kkpp_read( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + &ctx->grp.G, + &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, ID_PEER, + buf, len ) ); +} + +/* + * Generate and write the first round message + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + return( ecjpake_kkpp_write( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + &ctx->grp.G, + &ctx->xm1, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->Xm2, + ID_MINE, buf, len, olen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Compute the sum of three points R = A + B + C + */ +static int ecjpake_ecp_add3( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *A, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *B, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *C ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi one; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &one, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, R, &one, A, &one, B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, R, &one, R, &one, C ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &one ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read and process second round message (C: 7.4.2.5, S: 7.4.2.6) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GB, S: GA */ + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &G ); + + /* + * Server: GA = X3 + X4 + X1 (7.4.2.6.1) + * Client: GB = X1 + X2 + X3 (7.4.2.5.1) + * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xm2 + Xp1 + * We need that before parsing in order to check Xp as we read it + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_ecp_add3( &ctx->grp, &G, + &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->Xp1 ) ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; // only client reading server msg + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp; + * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams; + */ + if( ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( &grp, &p, len ) ); + if( grp.id != ctx->grp.id ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + ctx->point_format, + &G, &ctx->Xp, ID_PEER, &p, end ) ); + + if( p != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &G ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute R = +/- X * S mod N, taking care not to leak S + */ +static int ecjpake_mul_secret( mbedtls_mpi *R, int sign, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *S, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi b; /* Blinding value, then s + N * blinding */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &b ); + + /* b = s + rnd-128-bit * N */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &b, 16, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &b, &b, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &b, &b, S ) ); + + /* R = sign * X * b mod N */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( R, X, &b ) ); + R->s *= sign; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( R, R, N ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &b ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate and write the second round message (S: 7.4.2.5, C: 7.4.2.6) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GA, S: GB */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xm; /* C: Xc, S: Xs */ + mbedtls_mpi xm; /* C: xc, S: xs */ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + size_t ec_len; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &G ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Xm ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &xm ); + + /* + * First generate private/public key pair (S: 7.4.2.5.1, C: 7.4.2.6.1) + * + * Client: GA = X1 + X3 + X4 | xs = x2 * s | Xc = xc * GA + * Server: GB = X3 + X1 + X2 | xs = x4 * s | Xs = xs * GB + * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xp1 + Xp2 | xm = xm2 * s | Xm = xm * G + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_ecp_add3( &ctx->grp, &G, + &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, &ctx->Xm1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_mul_secret( &xm, 1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, + &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &Xm, &xm, &G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* + * Now write things out + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; // only server writing its message + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp; + * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams; + */ + if( ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER ) + { + if( end < p ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &ec_len, + p, end - p ) ); + p += ec_len; + } + + if( end < p ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &Xm, + ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, end - p ) ); + p += ec_len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_write( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + ctx->point_format, + &G, &xm, &Xm, ID_MINE, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &G ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Xm ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &xm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Derive PMS (7.4.2.7 / 7.4.2.8) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one; + unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t x_bytes; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + if( len < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &m_xm2_s ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &one, 1 ) ); + + /* + * Client: K = ( Xs - X4 * x2 * s ) * x2 + * Server: K = ( Xc - X2 * x4 * s ) * x4 + * Unified: K = ( Xp - Xp2 * xm2 * s ) * xm2 + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_mul_secret( &m_xm2_s, -1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, + &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &ctx->grp, &K, + &one, &ctx->Xp, + &m_xm2_s, &ctx->Xp2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &K, &ctx->xm2, &K, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* PMS = SHA-256( K.X ) */ + x_bytes = ( ctx->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &K.X, kx, x_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( ctx->md_info, kx, x_bytes, buf ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &m_xm2_s ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &one ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#undef ID_MINE +#undef ID_PEER + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include <stdio.h> +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + (void) verbose; + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_password[] = { + 0x74, 0x68, 0x72, 0x65, 0x61, 0x64, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x61, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x74, + 0x65, 0x73, 0x74 +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x1[] = { + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, + 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, + 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x21 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x2[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x3[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x4[] = { + 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, + 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, + 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe1 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_one[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0xac, 0xcf, 0x01, 0x06, 0xef, 0x85, 0x8f, 0xa2, 0xd9, 0x19, + 0x33, 0x13, 0x46, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x8b, 0xba, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0x44, + 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x89, 0x28, 0x79, 0x14, 0x61, 0x87, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x66, 0xad, + 0xa7, 0x81, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x13, 0x72, 0x25, 0x1a, 0x89, 0x10, 0x62, + 0x1f, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0x28, 0xac, 0x48, 0xe3, 0x81, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0xf9, + 0x06, 0x07, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x94, 0xa4, 0x41, 0x04, 0x1d, 0xd0, 0xbd, 0x5d, + 0x45, 0x66, 0xc9, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xce, 0x7d, 0xe7, 0x01, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0x2e, + 0x08, 0xe8, 0x4b, 0x73, 0x04, 0x66, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x03, 0xc7, 0x9e, + 0xb9, 0x82, 0x17, 0x22, 0x36, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0x72, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0xbf, 0x73, + 0x61, 0x0d, 0x34, 0xde, 0x44, 0x24, 0x6e, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0xc0, 0x5a, 0x22, + 0x36, 0xfb, 0x66, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x3d, 0x74, 0x49, 0x30, 0x8b, 0xab, 0xce, + 0x20, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x16, 0x66, 0x29, 0x92, 0xe9, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x25, 0x00, + 0x2f, 0x11, 0xb1, 0x50, 0x87, 0xb8, 0x27, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0x94, 0x5b, + 0xf7, 0xa2, 0x99, 0x5d, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x98, 0x34, 0x58, 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, + 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, + 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, + 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, + 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, + 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, + 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2e, 0xd1, 0xeb, + 0xfc, 0x18, 0x16, 0xaf, 0x4f, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x55, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xca, 0x47, + 0xb2, 0xa0, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x7c, 0xaf, 0x11, 0x79, 0xea, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0x39, + 0x5b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x61, 0x96, 0x40, 0x16, 0xfa, 0xba, 0xf7, 0x2c, 0x97, + 0x56, 0x95, 0xd9, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x40, + 0x63, 0x4e, 0xd5, 0x97, 0x64, 0x93, 0x77, 0x87, 0xbe, 0x20, 0xbc, 0x4d, + 0xee, 0xbb, 0xf9, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x0a, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x04, 0x6c, 0xa3, 0xaa, + 0x94, 0x1e, 0x45, 0x86, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0xad, 0xef, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0x8b, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x44, 0x3e, 0xf0 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_one[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, + 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, + 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, + 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, + 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, + 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0x09, 0xf8, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0x20, 0xeb, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x64, 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x64, + 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x28, 0x7a, 0xa3, 0x65, 0xf1, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x36, + 0x0f, 0xf3, 0x86, 0xd8, 0x46, 0x89, 0x8b, 0xc4, 0xb4, 0x15, 0x83, 0xc2, + 0xa5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x65, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x42, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xec, + 0x0a, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0x2f, 0x27, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x0a, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0x16, + 0x20, 0x93, 0x4d, 0x74, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xe5, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0x24, 0xfd, 0x96, + 0x30, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x17, 0xbf, 0x13, 0x1a, 0xfa, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xa9, 0xd3, + 0x3d, 0x11, 0x98, 0xd9, 0x05, 0x19, 0x37, 0x35, 0x14, 0x41, 0x04, 0x19, + 0x0a, 0x07, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xfa, 0x4b, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xee, 0x0f, + 0x06, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x44, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xdd, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0xdf, 0x70, 0xf8, + 0x62, 0x33, 0x21, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x54, 0xf3, 0x55, 0xf0, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0xc7, + 0x83, 0xed, 0x35, 0x9e, 0x5d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x37, 0x7a, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0xea, + 0x7a, 0xce, 0x47, 0x3c, 0x9c, 0x11, 0x2b, 0x41, 0xcc, 0xd4, 0x1a, 0xc5, + 0x6a, 0x56, 0x12, 0x41, 0x04, 0x36, 0x0a, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x33, 0xfc, 0xe6, + 0x41, 0x15, 0x64, 0x58, 0xe0, 0xa4, 0xea, 0xc2, 0x19, 0xe9, 0x68, 0x31, + 0xe6, 0xae, 0xbc, 0x88, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0x75, 0x2f, 0x93, 0xa0, 0x28, 0x1d, + 0x1b, 0xf1, 0xfb, 0x10, 0x60, 0x51, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x94, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0xe8, + 0x62, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x13, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0x78, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xee, + 0x4f, 0x7c, 0x59, 0x19, 0x99, 0x65, 0xa8, 0xdd, 0x4a, 0x20, 0x91, 0x84, + 0x7d, 0x2d, 0x22, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0xaa, 0x2a, 0x3f, 0xb3, 0x3f, + 0xd2, 0xd1, 0xe0, 0x55, 0xa0, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x61, 0xec, 0xfb, 0x8d, 0x80, + 0xec, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x12 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_two[] = { + 0x03, 0x00, 0x17, 0x41, 0x04, 0x0f, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x5d, 0x11, 0x23, + 0xe0, 0xef, 0x9f, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0x59, 0x0a, 0x1f, 0x4d, 0x7c, + 0xed, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x58, 0x6e, 0x8f, 0x2a, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0x2f, + 0xda, 0x43, 0x28, 0xa2, 0x0b, 0x07, 0xd8, 0xfd, 0x66, 0x76, 0x54, 0xca, + 0x18, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0x32, 0xa3, 0x33, 0xa0, 0x84, 0x54, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x26, + 0xee, 0x88, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0xaa, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0x41, 0x04, 0x55, + 0x16, 0xea, 0x3e, 0x54, 0xa0, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xce, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x38, + 0xd3, 0x83, 0x37, 0x00, 0x29, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xe4, 0x45, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xd6, + 0x01, 0xb4, 0x08, 0xa2, 0x4a, 0xe6, 0x46, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0xc9, 0x05, 0xb9, + 0xeb, 0x03, 0xb5, 0xd3, 0x69, 0x1c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x3f, 0x1c, 0xd4, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0xec, 0x39, 0x22, 0x18, 0xa5, 0x9e, 0xd2, + 0x43, 0xd3, 0xc8, 0x20, 0xff, 0x72, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0x70, 0xb8, 0x8c, 0xb8, + 0x6f, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc6, 0x86, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xcd, 0x79, 0x06, 0xdd, + 0x7c, 0x9b, 0xce, 0x35, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x08, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x26, 0x83, 0x6c +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_two[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0x69, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x5e, 0x90, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x12, 0x46, + 0x74, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x07, 0xe9, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x1d, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0xc5, 0xcb, + 0x98, 0x8b, 0x58, 0xc3, 0x10, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x72, + 0x0b, 0x45, 0x54, 0x1c, 0x83, 0xee, 0x88, 0x41, 0x19, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0xce, + 0xd8, 0x6e, 0x33, 0x12, 0xd4, 0x36, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x98, + 0x9a, 0xba, 0x4a, 0xff, 0xd1, 0xee, 0x41, 0x04, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x8c, 0x31, + 0xe2, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xc1, 0x35, 0x93, 0xe6, 0x9f, 0x15, + 0xbe, 0x85, 0xc2, 0x7d, 0x68, 0xcd, 0x09, 0xcc, 0xb8, 0xc4, 0x18, 0x36, + 0x08, 0x91, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0x3d, 0x40, 0x9f, 0xac, 0x39, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe8, + 0x2f, 0x72, 0x92, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x0d, 0x23, 0xe0, 0x55, 0x91, 0x3f, 0x45, + 0xa5, 0x2b, 0x85, 0xdd, 0x8a, 0x20, 0x52, 0xe9, 0xe1, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x4d, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x1f, 0x19, 0x48, 0x35, 0x35, 0xa6, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x58, + 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x03, 0xba, 0xf2, 0x14, 0x62, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0x82, + 0xcc, 0x38, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x60, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x4c +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = { + 0xf3, 0xd4, 0x7f, 0x59, 0x98, 0x44, 0xdb, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x69, 0xbb, 0xe7, + 0x98, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x31, 0xfd, 0x74, 0x3b, 0xf2, 0x2e, 0x98, 0xf9, + 0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51 +}; + +/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */ +static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1, + const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm1, xm1, len1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm2, xm2, len2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1, + &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2, + &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +/* For tests we don't need a secure RNG; + * use the LGC from Numerical Recipes for simplicity */ +static int ecjpake_lgc( void *p, unsigned char *out, size_t len ) +{ + static uint32_t x = 42; + (void) p; + + while( len > 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = len > 4 ? 4 : len; + x = 1664525 * x + 1013904223; + memcpy( out, &x, use_len ); + out += use_len; + len -= use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define TEST_ASSERT( x ) \ + do { \ + if( x ) \ + ret = 0; \ + else \ + { \ + ret = 1; \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecjpake_context cli; + mbedtls_ecjpake_context srv; + unsigned char buf[512], pms[32]; + size_t len, pmslen; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &cli ); + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &srv ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #0 (setup): " ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &cli, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + ecjpake_test_password, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_password ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &srv, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + ecjpake_test_password, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_password ) ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #1 (random handshake): " ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &cli, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &cli, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &cli, + pms, sizeof( pms ), &pmslen, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == pmslen ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, pms, len ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + /* 'reference handshake' tests can only be run against implementations + * for which we have 100% control over how the random ephemeral keys + * are generated. This is only the case for the internal mbed TLS + * implementation, so these tests are skipped in case the internal + * implementation is swapped out for an alternative one. */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #2 (reference handshake): " ); + + /* Simulate generation of round one */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_test_load( &cli, + ecjpake_test_x1, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x1 ), + ecjpake_test_x2, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x2 ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_test_load( &srv, + ecjpake_test_x3, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x3 ), + ecjpake_test_x4, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x4 ) ) ); + + /* Read round one */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &srv, + ecjpake_test_cli_one, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_cli_one ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &cli, + ecjpake_test_srv_one, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_srv_one ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Skip generation of round two, read round two */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &cli, + ecjpake_test_srv_two, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_srv_two ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &srv, + ecjpake_test_cli_two, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_cli_two ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Server derives PMS */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == sizeof( ecjpake_test_pms ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len ) == 0 ); + + memset( buf, 0, len ); /* Avoid interferences with next step */ + + /* Client derives PMS */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == sizeof( ecjpake_test_pms ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &cli ); + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &srv ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#undef TEST_ASSERT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ |