Removed old mbedtls, replacing with submodule.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1012 deletions

diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecdsa.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecdsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 640eb24..0000000
--- a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ecdsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1012 +0,0 @@
-/*
- *  Elliptic curve DSA
- *
- *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- *  limitations under the License.
- */
-
-/*
- * References:
- *
- * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg
- */
-
-#include "common.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
-
-#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
-#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#else
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#define mbedtls_calloc    calloc
-#define mbedtls_free       free
-#endif
-
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
-
-/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */
-#define ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond )    \
-    MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
-#define ECDSA_VALIDATE( cond )        \
-    MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-
-/*
- * Sub-context for ecdsa_verify()
- */
-struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver
-{
-    mbedtls_mpi u1, u2;     /* intermediate values  */
-    enum {                  /* what to do next?     */
-        ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started      */
-        ecdsa_ver_muladd,   /* muladd step          */
-    } state;
-};
-
-/*
- * Init verify restart sub-context
- */
-static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx )
-{
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u1 );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u2 );
-    ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free the components of a verify restart sub-context
- */
-static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx )
-{
-    if( ctx == NULL )
-        return;
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u1 );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u2 );
-
-    ecdsa_restart_ver_init( ctx );
-}
-
-/*
- * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign()
- */
-struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig
-{
-    int sign_tries;
-    int key_tries;
-    mbedtls_mpi k;          /* per-signature random */
-    mbedtls_mpi r;          /* r value              */
-    enum {                  /* what to do next?     */
-        ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started      */
-        ecdsa_sig_mul,      /* doing ecp_mul()      */
-        ecdsa_sig_modn,     /* mod N computations   */
-    } state;
-};
-
-/*
- * Init verify sign sub-context
- */
-static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx )
-{
-    ctx->sign_tries = 0;
-    ctx->key_tries = 0;
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->k );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->r );
-    ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free the components of a sign restart sub-context
- */
-static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx )
-{
-    if( ctx == NULL )
-        return;
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->k );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->r );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-/*
- * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det()
- */
-struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det
-{
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;  /* DRBG state   */
-    enum {                      /* what to do next?     */
-        ecdsa_det_init = 0,     /* getting started      */
-        ecdsa_det_sign,         /* make signature       */
-    } state;
-};
-
-/*
- * Init verify sign_det sub-context
- */
-static void ecdsa_restart_det_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx )
-{
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx->rng_ctx );
-    ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context
- */
-static void ecdsa_restart_det_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx )
-{
-    if( ctx == NULL )
-        return;
-
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx->rng_ctx );
-
-    ecdsa_restart_det_init( ctx );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
-
-#define ECDSA_RS_ECP    ( rs_ctx == NULL ? NULL : &rs_ctx->ecp )
-
-/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */
-#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops )   \
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, ECDSA_RS_ECP, ops ) );
-
-/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */
-#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB )   do {                                 \
-    /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */                 \
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0 )                 \
-        rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0;                                    \
-                                                                     \
-    /* set up our own sub-context if needed */                       \
-    if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() &&                          \
-        rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL )                      \
-    {                                                                \
-        rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) );   \
-        if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL )                                    \
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED );                  \
-                                                                     \
-        ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB );                 \
-    }                                                                \
-} while( 0 )
-
-/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */
-#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB )   do {                                 \
-    /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL &&                     \
-        ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )                         \
-    {                                                                \
-        ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB );                 \
-        mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB );                                 \
-        rs_ctx->SUB = NULL;                                          \
-    }                                                                \
-                                                                     \
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL )                                             \
-        rs_ctx->ecp.depth--;                                         \
-} while( 0 )
-
-#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-#define ECDSA_RS_ECP    NULL
-
-#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops )   /* no-op; for compatibility */
-
-#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB )   (void) rs_ctx
-#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB )   (void) rs_ctx
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) || \
-    !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)     || \
-    !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
-/*
- * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len
- * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3
- */
-static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x,
-                       const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen )
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
-    size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen;
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) );
-    if( use_size * 8 > grp->nbits )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) );
-
-    /* While at it, reduce modulo N */
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) );
-
-cleanup:
-    return( ret );
-}
-#endif /* ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC || !ECDSA_SIGN_ALT || !ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
-/*
- * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
- * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
- */
-static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
-                mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
-                const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
-                int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                void *p_rng_blind,
-                mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
-    int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
-    int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries;
-    mbedtls_ecp_point R;
-    mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
-    mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r;
-
-    /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
-    if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
-    /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
-
-    mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );
-
-    ECDSA_RS_ENTER( sig );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
-    {
-        /* redirect to our context */
-        p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries;
-        p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries;
-        pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k;
-        pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r;
-
-        /* jump to current step */
-        if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul )
-            goto mul;
-        if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn )
-            goto modn;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-    *p_sign_tries = 0;
-    do
-    {
-        if( (*p_sign_tries)++ > 10 )
-        {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
-         * and set r = xR mod n
-         */
-        *p_key_tries = 0;
-        do
-        {
-            if( (*p_key_tries)++ > 10 )
-            {
-                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
-                goto cleanup;
-            }
-
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-            if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
-                rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul;
-
-mul:
-#endif
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
-                                                          f_rng_blind,
-                                                          p_rng_blind,
-                                                          ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
-        }
-        while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-        if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
-            rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn;
-
-modn:
-#endif
-        /*
-         * Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop
-         * (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t)
-         */
-        ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4 );
-
-        /*
-         * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
-         */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
-
-        /*
-         * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
-         * avoiding a potential timing leak.
-         */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng_blind,
-                                                  p_rng_blind ) );
-
-        /*
-         * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
-         */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, pr, d ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pk, pk, &t ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pk, pk, &grp->N ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
-    }
-    while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
-        mbedtls_mpi_copy( r, pr );
-#endif
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );
-
-    ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( sig );
-
-    return( ret );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid )
-{
-    switch( gid )
-    {
-#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
-        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: return 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
-        case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: return 0;
-#endif
-    default: return 1;
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
-                const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp   != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf   != NULL || blen == 0 );
-
-    /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
-    return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
-                                    f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-/*
- * Deterministic signature wrapper
- */
-static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
-                    mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
-                    const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                    int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                    void *p_rng_blind,
-                    mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
-    unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
-    size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
-    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
-    mbedtls_mpi h;
-
-    if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
-
-    ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
-    {
-        /* redirect to our context */
-        p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
-
-        /* jump to current step */
-        if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign )
-            goto sign;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-    /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
-        rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
-
-sign:
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
-    (void) f_rng_blind;
-    (void) p_rng_blind;
-    ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
-                              mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
-#else
-    if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
-        ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
-                                      mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
-                                      f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
-    else
-    {
-        mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det;
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-        /*
-         * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
-         * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
-         * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
-         * risk that they leak this way.
-         */
-        const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
-        mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
-
-        mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
-        p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind;
-        mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info,
-                                    data, 2 * grp_len );
-        ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det,
-                                            (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
-                                            strlen( blind_label ) );
-        if( ret != 0 )
-        {
-            mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-#else
-        /*
-         * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store
-         * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every
-         * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of
-         * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the
-         * restartable feature.
-         *
-         * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the
-         * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic
-         * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as
-         * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still
-         * a valid ECDSA signature.
-         */
-        p_rng_blind_det = p_rng;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-        /*
-         * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
-         * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
-         * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
-         * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
-         * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
-         */
-        ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
-                                      mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
-                                      mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det,
-                                      rs_ctx );
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-        mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
-#endif
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
-
-    ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det );
-
-    return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Deterministic signature wrappers
- */
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
-                            mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
-                            const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                            mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp   != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf   != NULL || blen == 0 );
-
-    return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
-                                        NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
-                                mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
-                                const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                                mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
-                                                   size_t),
-                                void *p_rng_blind )
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp   != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d     != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf   != NULL || blen == 0 );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng_blind != NULL );
-
-    return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
-                                        f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
-/*
- * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4)
- * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message)
- */
-static int ecdsa_verify_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
-                                     const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                                     const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
-                                     const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
-                                     mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
-    mbedtls_ecp_point R;
-    mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2;
-
-    mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );
-
-    /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
-    if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
-    ECDSA_RS_ENTER( ver );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL )
-    {
-        /* redirect to our context */
-        pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1;
-        pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2;
-
-        /* jump to current step */
-        if( rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd )
-            goto muladd;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-    /*
-     * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1
-     */
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
-    {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
-
-    /*
-     * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n
-     */
-    ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2 );
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) );
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu1, &e, &s_inv ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu1, pu1, &grp->N ) );
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu2, r, &s_inv ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu2, pu2, &grp->N ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL )
-        rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd;
-
-muladd:
-#endif
-    /*
-     * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp,
-                     &R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
-
-    if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
-    {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op)
-     * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v)
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
-
-    /*
-     * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r
-     */
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 )
-    {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );
-
-    ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( ver );
-
-    return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
-                          const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
-                          const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
-                          const mbedtls_mpi *r,
-                          const mbedtls_mpi *s)
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( Q   != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r   != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s   != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
-
-    return( ecdsa_verify_restartable( grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
-
-/*
- * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1
- */
-static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
-                                    unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen )
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = {0};
-    unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf );
-    size_t len = 0;
-
-    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) );
-    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) );
-
-    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) );
-    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, buf,
-                                       MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
-
-    memcpy( sig, p, len );
-    *slen = len;
-
-    return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute and write signature
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
-                           mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                           const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
-                           unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
-                           int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                           void *p_rng,
-                           mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_mpi r, s;
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx  != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig  != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
-                                                 hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng,
-                                                 p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
-#else
-    (void) md_alg;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
-    (void) rs_ctx;
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
-                         hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-#else
-    /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
-                                             hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng,
-                                             p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
-
-    return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute and write signature
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
-                                 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                 const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
-                                 unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
-                                 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                 void *p_rng )
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx  != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig  != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
-    return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
-                ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
-}
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
-    defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
-                               const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
-                               unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
-                               mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx  != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig  != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
-    return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen,
-                                   NULL, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Read and check signature
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
-                          const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
-                          const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen )
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx  != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig  != NULL );
-    return( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
-                ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Restartable read and check signature
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
-                          const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
-                          const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen,
-                          mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig;
-    const unsigned char *end = sig + slen;
-    size_t len;
-    mbedtls_mpi r, s;
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx  != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig  != NULL );
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
-
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
-                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
-    {
-        ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if( p + len != end )
-    {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
-              MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 )
-    {
-        ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
-    (void) rs_ctx;
-
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
-                                      &ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 )
-        goto cleanup;
-#else
-    if( ( ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
-                              &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
-        goto cleanup;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
-
-    /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature.
-     * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific
-     * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */
-    if( p != end )
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
-
-    return( ret );
-}
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT)
-/*
- * Generate key pair
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
-                  int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx   != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
-
-    ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid );
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return( ret );
-
-   return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d,
-                                    &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */
-
-/*
- * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key )
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
-
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 ||
-        ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 )
-    {
-        mbedtls_ecdsa_free( ctx );
-    }
-
-    return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize context
- */
-void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
-
-    mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx );
-}
-
-/*
- * Free context
- */
-void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
-{
-    if( ctx == NULL )
-        return;
-
-    mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-/*
- * Initialize a restart context
- */
-void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx )
-{
-    ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
-
-    mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->ecp );
-
-    ctx->ver = NULL;
-    ctx->sig = NULL;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-    ctx->det = NULL;
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Free the components of a restart context
- */
-void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx )
-{
-    if( ctx == NULL )
-        return;
-
-    mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->ecp );
-
-    ecdsa_restart_ver_free( ctx->ver );
-    mbedtls_free( ctx->ver );
-    ctx->ver = NULL;
-
-    ecdsa_restart_sig_free( ctx->sig );
-    mbedtls_free( ctx->sig );
-    ctx->sig = NULL;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-    ecdsa_restart_det_free( ctx->det );
-    mbedtls_free( ctx->det );
-    ctx->det = NULL;
-#endif
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */