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authorAdam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com>2023-07-06 06:37:41 -0400
committerAdam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com>2023-07-06 06:37:41 -0400
commit9db10386430479067795bec66bb26343ff176ded (patch)
tree5ad0cf95abde7cf03afaf8f70af8549d46b09a46 /lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c
parent57092d80cb07fa1a84873769fa92165426196054 (diff)
downloadlite-xl-plugin-manager-9db10386430479067795bec66bb26343ff176ded.tar.gz
lite-xl-plugin-manager-9db10386430479067795bec66bb26343ff176ded.zip
Removed old mbedtls, replacing with submodule.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c901
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 901 deletions
diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ab52861..0000000
--- a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,901 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90)
- *
- * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-/*
- * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication.
- *
- * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90revised_March2007.pdf
- */
-
-#include "common.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-
-#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
-#include <stdio.h>
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#else
-#include <stdio.h>
-#define mbedtls_printf printf
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
-
-/*
- * CTR_DRBG context initialization
- */
-void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx )
-{
- memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) );
- /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly.
- * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */
- ctx->reseed_counter = -1;
-
- ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
-}
-
-/*
- * This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately
- * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init().
- */
-void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx )
-{
- if( ctx == NULL )
- return;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */
- if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL )
- mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex );
-#endif
- mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->aes_ctx );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) );
- ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
- ctx->reseed_counter = -1;
-}
-
-void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- int resistance )
-{
- ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance;
-}
-
-void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- size_t len )
-{
- ctx->entropy_len = len;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- size_t len )
-{
- /* If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() has already been called, it's
- * too late. Return the error code that's closest to making sense. */
- if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
-
- if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
-#if SIZE_MAX > INT_MAX
- /* This shouldn't be an issue because
- * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible
- * configuration, but make sure anyway. */
- if( len > INT_MAX )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
-#endif
-
- /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the
- * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't
- * used until after the initial seeding. */
- /* Due to the capping of len above, the value fits in an int. */
- ctx->reseed_counter = (int) len;
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- int interval )
-{
- ctx->reseed_interval = interval;
-}
-
-static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output,
- const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
-{
- unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16];
- unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
- unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE];
- unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
- unsigned char *p, *iv;
- mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx;
- int ret = 0;
-
- int i, j;
- size_t buf_len, use_len;
-
- if( data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
-
- memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 );
- mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx );
-
- /*
- * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer
- * IV = Counter (in 32-bits) padded to 16 with zeroes
- * S = Length input string (in 32-bits) || Length of output (in 32-bits) ||
- * data || 0x80
- * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes)
- */
- p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
- *p++ = ( data_len >> 24 ) & 0xff;
- *p++ = ( data_len >> 16 ) & 0xff;
- *p++ = ( data_len >> 8 ) & 0xff;
- *p++ = ( data_len ) & 0xff;
- p += 3;
- *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN;
- memcpy( p, data, data_len );
- p[data_len] = 0x80;
-
- buf_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 8 + data_len + 1;
-
- for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++ )
- key[i] = i;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key,
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
- {
- goto exit;
- }
-
- /*
- * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data
- */
- for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE )
- {
- p = buf;
- memset( chain, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE );
- use_len = buf_len;
-
- while( use_len > 0 )
- {
- for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++ )
- chain[i] ^= p[i];
- p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
- use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ?
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
- chain, chain ) ) != 0 )
- {
- goto exit;
- }
- }
-
- memcpy( tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE );
-
- /*
- * Update IV
- */
- buf[3]++;
- }
-
- /*
- * Do final encryption with reduced data
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp,
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
- {
- goto exit;
- }
- iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE;
- p = output;
-
- for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
- iv, iv ) ) != 0 )
- {
- goto exit;
- }
- memcpy( p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE );
- p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
- }
-exit:
- mbedtls_aes_free( &aes_ctx );
- /*
- * tidy up the stack
- */
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( chain, sizeof( chain ) );
- if( 0 != ret )
- {
- /*
- * wipe partial seed from memory
- */
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN );
- }
-
- return( ret );
-}
-
-/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.2)
- * ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data)
- * implements
- * CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V)
- * with inputs and outputs
- * ctx->aes_ctx = Key
- * ctx->counter = V
- */
-static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] )
-{
- unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
- unsigned char *p = tmp;
- int i, j;
- int ret = 0;
-
- memset( tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN );
-
- for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE )
- {
- /*
- * Increase counter
- */
- for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- )
- if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 )
- break;
-
- /*
- * Crypt counter block
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
- ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 )
- {
- goto exit;
- }
-
- p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
- }
-
- for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++ )
- tmp[i] ^= data[i];
-
- /*
- * Update key and counter
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp,
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
- {
- goto exit;
- }
- memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE,
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE );
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
- return( ret );
-}
-
-/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.3.2)
- * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len)
- * implements
- * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
- * security_strength) -> initial_working_state
- * with inputs
- * ctx->counter = all-bits-0
- * ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key
- * additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string
- * and with outputs
- * ctx = initial_working_state
- */
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional,
- size_t add_len )
-{
- unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- if( add_len == 0 )
- return( 0 );
-
- if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
- if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) );
- return( ret );
-}
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional,
- size_t add_len )
-{
- /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match
- * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */
- if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
- add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT;
- (void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
-/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.4.2)
- * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len)
- * implements
- * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input)
- * -> new_working_state
- * with inputs
- * ctx contains working_state
- * additional[:len] = additional_input
- * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy
- * for (ctx->entropy_len + nonce_len) bytes
- * and with output
- * ctx contains new_working_state
- */
-static int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional,
- size_t len,
- size_t nonce_len )
-{
- unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
- size_t seedlen = 0;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- if( ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
- if( nonce_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
- if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len - nonce_len )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
-
- memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
-
- /* Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state. */
- if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
- }
- seedlen += ctx->entropy_len;
-
- /* Gather entropy for a nonce if requested. */
- if( nonce_len != 0 )
- {
- if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, nonce_len ) )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
- }
- seedlen += nonce_len;
- }
-
- /* Add additional data if provided. */
- if( additional != NULL && len != 0 )
- {
- memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len );
- seedlen += len;
- }
-
- /* Reduce to 384 bits. */
- if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( seed, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
-
- /* Update state. */
- if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, seed ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
- ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, sizeof( seed ) );
- return( ret );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional, size_t len )
-{
- return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) );
-}
-
-/* Return a "good" nonce length for CTR_DRBG. The chosen nonce length
- * is sufficient to achieve the maximum security strength given the key
- * size and entropy length. If there is enough entropy in the initial
- * call to the entropy function to serve as both the entropy input and
- * the nonce, don't make a second call to get a nonce. */
-static size_t good_nonce_len( size_t entropy_len )
-{
- if( entropy_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 )
- return( 0 );
- else
- return( ( entropy_len + 1 ) / 2 );
-}
-
-/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.3.2)
- * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len)
- * implements
- * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
- * security_strength) -> initial_working_state
- * with inputs
- * custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string
- * where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for ctx->entropy_len bytes
- * and with outputs
- * ctx = initial_working_state
- */
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_entropy,
- const unsigned char *custom,
- size_t len )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE];
- size_t nonce_len;
-
- memset( key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE );
-
- /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
-#endif
-
- mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->aes_ctx );
-
- ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
- ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy;
-
- if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 )
- ctx->entropy_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN;
- /* ctx->reseed_counter contains the desired amount of entropy to
- * grab for a nonce (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()).
- * If it's -1, indicating that the entropy nonce length was not set
- * explicitly, use a sufficiently large nonce for security. */
- nonce_len = ( ctx->reseed_counter >= 0 ?
- (size_t) ctx->reseed_counter :
- good_nonce_len( ctx->entropy_len ) );
-
- /* Initialize with an empty key. */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key,
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
-
- /* Do the initial seeding. */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, custom, len,
- nonce_len ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.5.2)
- * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len)
- * implements
- * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len])
- * -> working_state_after_reseed
- * if required, then
- * CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed,
- * requested_number_of_bits, additional_input)
- * -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state
- * with inputs
- * ctx contains working_state
- * requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len
- * additional[:add_len] = additional_input
- * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy
- * and with outputs
- * status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally)
- * returned_bits = output[:output_len]
- * ctx contains new_working_state
- */
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
- unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
- const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len )
-{
- int ret = 0;
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng;
- unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
- unsigned char *p = output;
- unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
- int i;
- size_t use_len;
-
- if( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG );
-
- if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
-
- memset( add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN );
-
- if( ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ||
- ctx->prediction_resistance )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
- add_len = 0;
- }
-
- if( add_len > 0 )
- {
- if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
- if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
- }
-
- while( output_len > 0 )
- {
- /*
- * Increase counter
- */
- for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- )
- if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 )
- break;
-
- /*
- * Crypt counter block
- */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
- ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 )
- {
- goto exit;
- }
-
- use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE )
- ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len;
- /*
- * Copy random block to destination
- */
- memcpy( p, tmp, use_len );
- p += use_len;
- output_len -= use_len;
- }
-
- if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
-
- ctx->reseed_counter++;
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
- return( ret );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output,
- size_t output_len )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
-#endif
-
- ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, output_len, NULL, 0 );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
- if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
-#endif
-
- return( ret );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const char *path )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
- FILE *f;
- unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
-
- if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf,
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
-
- if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) !=
- MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
- }
- else
- {
- ret = 0;
- }
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
-
- fclose( f );
- return( ret );
-}
-
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const char *path )
-{
- int ret = 0;
- FILE *f = NULL;
- size_t n;
- unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
- unsigned char c;
-
- if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-
- n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f );
- if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
- goto exit;
- }
- if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
- goto exit;
- }
- fclose( f );
- f = NULL;
-
- ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n );
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
- if( f != NULL )
- fclose( f );
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
- return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
-
-/* The CTR_DRBG NIST test vectors used here are available at
- * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip
- *
- * The parameters used to derive the test data are:
- *
- * [AES-128 use df]
- * [PredictionResistance = True/False]
- * [EntropyInputLen = 128]
- * [NonceLen = 64]
- * [PersonalizationStringLen = 128]
- * [AdditionalInputLen = 0]
- * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512]
- *
- * [AES-256 use df]
- * [PredictionResistance = True/False]
- * [EntropyInputLen = 256]
- * [NonceLen = 128]
- * [PersonalizationStringLen = 256]
- * [AdditionalInputLen = 0]
- * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512]
- *
- */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY)
-static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] =
- { 0x04, 0xd9, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xbb,
- 0xf1, 0x08, 0x77, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xca, 0x92,
- 0x65, 0x16, 0xda, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x59, 0xf3, 0xe8,
- 0x38, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x70, 0x7b, 0x20,
- 0xec, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x66, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xe3, 0xb0,
- 0xe0, 0x86, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xad,
- 0xf7, 0xef, 0x06, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xe8 };
-
-static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] =
- { 0x07, 0x0d, 0x59, 0x63, 0x98, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x45,
- 0x27, 0x38, 0x22, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xa9,
- 0x74, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x20,
- 0x4a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x85, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6f,
- 0x00, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xda, 0xed, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x5c };
-
-static const unsigned char pers_pr[] =
- { 0xbf, 0xa4, 0x9a, 0x8f, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xb1, 0x7a,
- 0x9d, 0xfa, 0x45, 0xed, 0x21, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xad };
-
-static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] =
- { 0x4e, 0x61, 0x79, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x72, 0xa1, 0x4c,
- 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x0f };
-
-static const unsigned char result_pr[] =
- { 0xc9, 0x0a, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x89, 0x71, 0x44, 0x66,
- 0x4f, 0x25, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0xff,
- 0x52, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x10,
- 0x1f, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x62, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x30,
- 0xc9, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x69, 0xb4, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0xf4,
- 0x87, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0xcc,
- 0xd9, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0x06,
- 0x37, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xcf };
-
-static const unsigned char result_nopr[] =
- { 0x31, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x09, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x10, 0x13,
- 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xc0,
- 0x7c, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x99, 0xaf,
- 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0xf2,
- 0x33, 0x38, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x83, 0xb7,
- 0xa2, 0x53, 0xdc, 0xee, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf2,
- 0xee, 0x96, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x02,
- 0x76, 0x70, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x3b, 0xe8 };
-#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */
-
-static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] =
- { 0xca, 0x58, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xcb, 0x49,
- 0xd4, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x50, 0xd9, 0x8a,
- 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x74, 0xd5, 0x85,
- 0x8f, 0xd1, 0xba, 0x64, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x1e,
- 0xc5, 0xea, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x15,
- 0x09, 0x20, 0x92, 0x42, 0x32, 0x36, 0x45, 0x45,
- 0x7d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6b, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xc8,
- 0x2f, 0x9f, 0xbc, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0x2c,
- 0xb7, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x80, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xb3,
- 0x88, 0x1b, 0x21, 0x45, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0xce,
- 0xc8, 0x92, 0x35, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0x8e,
- 0x12, 0x38, 0xac, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x18, 0x76,
- 0x9c, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x13, 0xb6, 0x2c, 0x77,
- 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x44, 0x95, 0xbe };
-
-static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] =
- { 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x86, 0x73, 0x34, 0x6d, 0x9d,
- 0x50, 0xc9, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0xfc, 0xd0,
- 0x90, 0xad, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x73,
- 0x27, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x5c,
- 0x01, 0x69, 0x62, 0xa7, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x87, 0xa2,
- 0x4b, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x47, 0xef, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf1,
- 0xb7, 0xec, 0x46, 0x07, 0x23, 0x63, 0x83, 0x4a,
- 0x1b, 0x01, 0x33, 0xf2, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x91, 0xdb,
- 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x51, 0xf2, 0x3e, 0x3a,
- 0x8b, 0x1f, 0xdc, 0x03, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xc7, 0xe7 };
-
-static const unsigned char pers_pr[] =
- { 0x5a, 0x70, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x81, 0x40, 0x52, 0x33,
- 0x91, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x75, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x9d, 0x1e,
- 0xad, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0xde, 0x6c, 0x1f, 0xe0,
- 0xea, 0x18, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x06, 0x20, 0xe9 };
-
-static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] =
- { 0x88, 0xee, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x29,
- 0x4b, 0xda, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x99, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xbf,
- 0x55, 0xec, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x71, 0xe5, 0xeb,
- 0xcb, 0x45, 0x75, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0xa6, 0x8a, 0x6b };
-
-static const unsigned char result_pr[] =
- { 0xce, 0x2f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x85,
- 0x04, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x1d,
- 0x9b, 0x5a, 0x59, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x62,
- 0x7b, 0x65, 0x11, 0x55, 0x10, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x3d,
- 0xa4, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x74, 0xdb,
- 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x23, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd0, 0x39,
- 0xf9, 0xa7, 0xc4, 0x52, 0x84, 0x3b, 0x49, 0x40,
- 0x72, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xdb, 0xc3, 0x43 };
-
-static const unsigned char result_nopr[] =
- { 0xa5, 0x51, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbe, 0xf3, 0xad,
- 0xaf, 0x28, 0xf6, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xf3,
- 0xd6, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0xd0, 0x46, 0x7b,
- 0x0c, 0x75, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x14,
- 0x75, 0xb2, 0x7c, 0xae, 0x03, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x54,
- 0xe2, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x66, 0xea, 0x33, 0x64, 0x30,
- 0x40, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0x77, 0x87, 0x3a,
- 0xf8, 0x09, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x98 };
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */
-
-static size_t test_offset;
-static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len )
-{
- const unsigned char *p = data;
- memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len );
- test_offset += len;
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \
- { \
- if( verbose != 0 ) \
- mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \
- return( 1 ); \
- }
-
-#define SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH 64
-
-/*
- * Checkup routine
- */
-int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose )
-{
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx;
- unsigned char buf[ sizeof( result_pr ) ];
-
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx );
-
- /*
- * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = True)
- */
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : " );
-
- test_offset = 0;
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE );
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 );
- CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx,
- ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy,
- (void *) entropy_source_pr,
- pers_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) );
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON );
- CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) );
- CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_pr ) ) );
- CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, sizeof( result_pr ) ) );
-
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx );
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
-
- /*
- * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = FALSE)
- */
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): " );
-
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx );
-
- test_offset = 0;
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 );
- CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx,
- ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy,
- (void *) entropy_source_nopr,
- pers_nopr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) );
- CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) );
- CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) );
- CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) );
- CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) );
-
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx );
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */