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author | Adam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com> | 2023-07-06 06:37:41 -0400 |
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committer | Adam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com> | 2023-07-06 06:37:41 -0400 |
commit | 9db10386430479067795bec66bb26343ff176ded (patch) | |
tree | 5ad0cf95abde7cf03afaf8f70af8549d46b09a46 /lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c | |
parent | 57092d80cb07fa1a84873769fa92165426196054 (diff) | |
download | lite-xl-plugin-manager-9db10386430479067795bec66bb26343ff176ded.tar.gz lite-xl-plugin-manager-9db10386430479067795bec66bb26343ff176ded.zip |
Removed old mbedtls, replacing with submodule.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c | 901 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 901 deletions
diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c deleted file mode 100644 index ab52861..0000000 --- a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/ctr_drbg.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,901 +0,0 @@ -/* - * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90) - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication. - * - * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90revised_March2007.pdf - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - -#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include <string.h> - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -#include <stdio.h> -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include <stdio.h> -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -/* - * CTR_DRBG context initialization - */ -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); - /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly. - * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */ - ctx->reseed_counter = -1; - - ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; -} - -/* - * This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately - * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). - */ -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ - if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) - mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); -#endif - mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->aes_ctx ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); - ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; - ctx->reseed_counter = -1; -} - -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - int resistance ) -{ - ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; -} - -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - size_t len ) -{ - ctx->entropy_len = len; -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - size_t len ) -{ - /* If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() has already been called, it's - * too late. Return the error code that's closest to making sense. */ - if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); - - if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); -#if SIZE_MAX > INT_MAX - /* This shouldn't be an issue because - * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible - * configuration, but make sure anyway. */ - if( len > INT_MAX ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); -#endif - - /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the - * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't - * used until after the initial seeding. */ - /* Due to the capping of len above, the value fits in an int. */ - ctx->reseed_counter = (int) len; - return( 0 ); -} - -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - int interval ) -{ - ctx->reseed_interval = interval; -} - -static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, - const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) -{ - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16]; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; - unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; - unsigned char *p, *iv; - mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; - int ret = 0; - - int i, j; - size_t buf_len, use_len; - - if( data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - - memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 ); - mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); - - /* - * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer - * IV = Counter (in 32-bits) padded to 16 with zeroes - * S = Length input string (in 32-bits) || Length of output (in 32-bits) || - * data || 0x80 - * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes) - */ - p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 24 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 16 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len >> 8 ) & 0xff; - *p++ = ( data_len ) & 0xff; - p += 3; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; - memcpy( p, data, data_len ); - p[data_len] = 0x80; - - buf_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 8 + data_len + 1; - - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++ ) - key[i] = i; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key, - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - - /* - * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data - */ - for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) - { - p = buf; - memset( chain, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); - use_len = buf_len; - - while( use_len > 0 ) - { - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) - chain[i] ^= p[i]; - p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, - chain, chain ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - } - - memcpy( tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); - - /* - * Update IV - */ - buf[3]++; - } - - /* - * Do final encryption with reduced data - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp, - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; - p = output; - - for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, - iv, iv ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - memcpy( p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); - p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - } -exit: - mbedtls_aes_free( &aes_ctx ); - /* - * tidy up the stack - */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( chain, sizeof( chain ) ); - if( 0 != ret ) - { - /* - * wipe partial seed from memory - */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); - } - - return( ret ); -} - -/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.2) - * ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data) - * implements - * CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V) - * with inputs and outputs - * ctx->aes_ctx = Key - * ctx->counter = V - */ -static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] ) -{ - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - unsigned char *p = tmp; - int i, j; - int ret = 0; - - memset( tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); - - for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) - { - /* - * Increase counter - */ - for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) - if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* - * Crypt counter block - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, - ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - - p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; - } - - for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++ ) - tmp[i] ^= data[i]; - - /* - * Update key and counter - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); - return( ret ); -} - -/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) - * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len) - * implements - * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, - * security_strength) -> initial_working_state - * with inputs - * ctx->counter = all-bits-0 - * ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key - * additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string - * and with outputs - * ctx = initial_working_state - */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len ) -{ - unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if( add_len == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) ); - return( ret ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len ) -{ - /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match - * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */ - if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) - add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT; - (void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2) - * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len) - * implements - * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input) - * -> new_working_state - * with inputs - * ctx contains working_state - * additional[:len] = additional_input - * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy - * for (ctx->entropy_len + nonce_len) bytes - * and with output - * ctx contains new_working_state - */ -static int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t len, - size_t nonce_len ) -{ - unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; - size_t seedlen = 0; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if( ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - if( nonce_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len - nonce_len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - - memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); - - /* Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state. */ - if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); - } - seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; - - /* Gather entropy for a nonce if requested. */ - if( nonce_len != 0 ) - { - if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, nonce_len ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); - } - seedlen += nonce_len; - } - - /* Add additional data if provided. */ - if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) - { - memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); - seedlen += len; - } - - /* Reduce to 384 bits. */ - if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( seed, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - /* Update state. */ - if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, seed ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - ctx->reseed_counter = 1; - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, sizeof( seed ) ); - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); -} - -/* Return a "good" nonce length for CTR_DRBG. The chosen nonce length - * is sufficient to achieve the maximum security strength given the key - * size and entropy length. If there is enough entropy in the initial - * call to the entropy function to serve as both the entropy input and - * the nonce, don't make a second call to get a nonce. */ -static size_t good_nonce_len( size_t entropy_len ) -{ - if( entropy_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 ) - return( 0 ); - else - return( ( entropy_len + 1 ) / 2 ); -} - -/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) - * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len) - * implements - * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, - * security_strength) -> initial_working_state - * with inputs - * custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string - * where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for ctx->entropy_len bytes - * and with outputs - * ctx = initial_working_state - */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_entropy, - const unsigned char *custom, - size_t len ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; - size_t nonce_len; - - memset( key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); - - /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); -#endif - - mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->aes_ctx ); - - ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; - ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; - - if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) - ctx->entropy_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; - /* ctx->reseed_counter contains the desired amount of entropy to - * grab for a nonce (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). - * If it's -1, indicating that the entropy nonce length was not set - * explicitly, use a sufficiently large nonce for security. */ - nonce_len = ( ctx->reseed_counter >= 0 ? - (size_t) ctx->reseed_counter : - good_nonce_len( ctx->entropy_len ) ); - - /* Initialize with an empty key. */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key, - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - /* Do the initial seeding. */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, custom, len, - nonce_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - return( 0 ); -} - -/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.5.2) - * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len) - * implements - * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len]) - * -> working_state_after_reseed - * if required, then - * CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed, - * requested_number_of_bits, additional_input) - * -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state - * with inputs - * ctx contains working_state - * requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len - * additional[:add_len] = additional_input - * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy - * and with outputs - * status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally) - * returned_bits = output[:output_len] - * ctx contains new_working_state - */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, - unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; - unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; - unsigned char *p = output; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; - int i; - size_t use_len; - - if( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); - - if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); - - memset( add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); - - if( ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || - ctx->prediction_resistance ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( ret ); - } - add_len = 0; - } - - if( add_len > 0 ) - { - if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - } - - while( output_len > 0 ) - { - /* - * Increase counter - */ - for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) - if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - /* - * Crypt counter block - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, - ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - - use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) - ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len; - /* - * Copy random block to destination - */ - memcpy( p, tmp, use_len ); - p += use_len; - output_len -= use_len; - } - - if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - ctx->reseed_counter++; - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, - size_t output_len ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); -#endif - - ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, output_len, NULL, 0 ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); -#endif - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const char *path ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; - FILE *f; - unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; - - if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf, - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != - MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; - } - else - { - ret = 0; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - - fclose( f ); - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const char *path ) -{ - int ret = 0; - FILE *f = NULL; - size_t n; - unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; - unsigned char c; - - if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); - if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; - goto exit; - } - if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; - goto exit; - } - fclose( f ); - f = NULL; - - ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n ); - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - if( f != NULL ) - fclose( f ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* The CTR_DRBG NIST test vectors used here are available at - * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip - * - * The parameters used to derive the test data are: - * - * [AES-128 use df] - * [PredictionResistance = True/False] - * [EntropyInputLen = 128] - * [NonceLen = 64] - * [PersonalizationStringLen = 128] - * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] - * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] - * - * [AES-256 use df] - * [PredictionResistance = True/False] - * [EntropyInputLen = 256] - * [NonceLen = 128] - * [PersonalizationStringLen = 256] - * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] - * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] - * - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) -static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = - { 0x04, 0xd9, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xbb, - 0xf1, 0x08, 0x77, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xca, 0x92, - 0x65, 0x16, 0xda, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x59, 0xf3, 0xe8, - 0x38, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x70, 0x7b, 0x20, - 0xec, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x66, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xe3, 0xb0, - 0xe0, 0x86, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xad, - 0xf7, 0xef, 0x06, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xe8 }; - -static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = - { 0x07, 0x0d, 0x59, 0x63, 0x98, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x45, - 0x27, 0x38, 0x22, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xa9, - 0x74, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x20, - 0x4a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x85, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6f, - 0x00, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xda, 0xed, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x5c }; - -static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = - { 0xbf, 0xa4, 0x9a, 0x8f, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xb1, 0x7a, - 0x9d, 0xfa, 0x45, 0xed, 0x21, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xad }; - -static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = - { 0x4e, 0x61, 0x79, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x72, 0xa1, 0x4c, - 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x0f }; - -static const unsigned char result_pr[] = - { 0xc9, 0x0a, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x89, 0x71, 0x44, 0x66, - 0x4f, 0x25, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0xff, - 0x52, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x10, - 0x1f, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x62, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x30, - 0xc9, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x69, 0xb4, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0xf4, - 0x87, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0xcc, - 0xd9, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0x06, - 0x37, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xcf }; - -static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = - { 0x31, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x09, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x10, 0x13, - 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xc0, - 0x7c, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x99, 0xaf, - 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0xf2, - 0x33, 0x38, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x83, 0xb7, - 0xa2, 0x53, 0xdc, 0xee, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf2, - 0xee, 0x96, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x02, - 0x76, 0x70, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x3b, 0xe8 }; -#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ - -static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = - { 0xca, 0x58, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xcb, 0x49, - 0xd4, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x50, 0xd9, 0x8a, - 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x74, 0xd5, 0x85, - 0x8f, 0xd1, 0xba, 0x64, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x1e, - 0xc5, 0xea, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x15, - 0x09, 0x20, 0x92, 0x42, 0x32, 0x36, 0x45, 0x45, - 0x7d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6b, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xc8, - 0x2f, 0x9f, 0xbc, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0x2c, - 0xb7, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x80, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xb3, - 0x88, 0x1b, 0x21, 0x45, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0xce, - 0xc8, 0x92, 0x35, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0x8e, - 0x12, 0x38, 0xac, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x18, 0x76, - 0x9c, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x13, 0xb6, 0x2c, 0x77, - 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x44, 0x95, 0xbe }; - -static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = - { 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x86, 0x73, 0x34, 0x6d, 0x9d, - 0x50, 0xc9, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0xfc, 0xd0, - 0x90, 0xad, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x73, - 0x27, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x5c, - 0x01, 0x69, 0x62, 0xa7, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x87, 0xa2, - 0x4b, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x47, 0xef, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf1, - 0xb7, 0xec, 0x46, 0x07, 0x23, 0x63, 0x83, 0x4a, - 0x1b, 0x01, 0x33, 0xf2, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x91, 0xdb, - 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x51, 0xf2, 0x3e, 0x3a, - 0x8b, 0x1f, 0xdc, 0x03, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xc7, 0xe7 }; - -static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = - { 0x5a, 0x70, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x81, 0x40, 0x52, 0x33, - 0x91, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x75, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x9d, 0x1e, - 0xad, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0xde, 0x6c, 0x1f, 0xe0, - 0xea, 0x18, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x06, 0x20, 0xe9 }; - -static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = - { 0x88, 0xee, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x29, - 0x4b, 0xda, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x99, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xbf, - 0x55, 0xec, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x71, 0xe5, 0xeb, - 0xcb, 0x45, 0x75, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0xa6, 0x8a, 0x6b }; - -static const unsigned char result_pr[] = - { 0xce, 0x2f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x85, - 0x04, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x1d, - 0x9b, 0x5a, 0x59, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x62, - 0x7b, 0x65, 0x11, 0x55, 0x10, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x3d, - 0xa4, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x74, 0xdb, - 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x23, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd0, 0x39, - 0xf9, 0xa7, 0xc4, 0x52, 0x84, 0x3b, 0x49, 0x40, - 0x72, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xdb, 0xc3, 0x43 }; - -static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = - { 0xa5, 0x51, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbe, 0xf3, 0xad, - 0xaf, 0x28, 0xf6, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xf3, - 0xd6, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0xd0, 0x46, 0x7b, - 0x0c, 0x75, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x14, - 0x75, 0xb2, 0x7c, 0xae, 0x03, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x54, - 0xe2, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x66, 0xea, 0x33, 0x64, 0x30, - 0x40, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0x77, 0x87, 0x3a, - 0xf8, 0x09, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x98 }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ - -static size_t test_offset; -static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf, - size_t len ) -{ - const unsigned char *p = data; - memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); - test_offset += len; - return( 0 ); -} - -#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ - { \ - if( verbose != 0 ) \ - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ - return( 1 ); \ - } - -#define SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH 64 - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; - unsigned char buf[ sizeof( result_pr ) ]; - - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); - - /* - * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = True) - */ - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : " ); - - test_offset = 0; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, - ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, - (void *) entropy_source_pr, - pers_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); - CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); - - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - /* - * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = FALSE) - */ - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): " ); - - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); - - test_offset = 0; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, - ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, - (void *) entropy_source_nopr, - pers_nopr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); - CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); - CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); - - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ |