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authorAdam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com>2022-11-26 16:20:59 -0500
committerAdam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com>2022-11-29 18:39:46 -0500
commitfc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875 (patch)
tree6e7723c3f45d39f06c243d9c18a3c038da948793 /lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
parent3836606e2b735ba7b2dc0f580231843660587fb4 (diff)
downloadlite-xl-plugin-manager-fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875.tar.gz
lite-xl-plugin-manager-fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875.zip
Removed openssl, and curl, and added mbedded tls.curl-removal
Almost fully removed curl, needs more testing. Fixed most issues, now trying to cross compile. Fix? Sigh.
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+/**
+ * \file x509_crt.h
+ *
+ * \brief X.509 certificate parsing and writing
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
+#include "mbedtls/config.h"
+#else
+#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+
+/**
+ * \addtogroup x509_module
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt
+{
+ int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned
+ * by the structure or not. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
+
+ int version; /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf serial; /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */
+ mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_time valid_from; /**< Start time of certificate validity. */
+ mbedtls_x509_time valid_to; /**< End time of certificate validity. */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf pk_raw;
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */
+
+ int ext_types; /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */
+ int ca_istrue; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */
+ int max_pathlen; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */
+
+ unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */
+
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf sig; /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */
+ mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */
+ void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */
+
+ struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */
+}
+mbedtls_x509_crt;
+
+/**
+ * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
+ * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name
+{
+ /**
+ * The type_id is an OID as deifned in RFC 5280.
+ * To check the value of the type id, you should use
+ * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf.
+ */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */
+ union
+ {
+ /**
+ * From RFC 4108 section 5:
+ * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
+ */
+ struct
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */
+ }
+ hardware_module_name;
+ }
+ value;
+}
+mbedtls_x509_san_other_name;
+
+/**
+ * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name
+{
+ int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */
+ union {
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */
+ }
+ san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */
+}
+mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name;
+
+/**
+ * Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp)
+ * Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( id ) ( 1 << ( (id) - 1 ) )
+
+/**
+ * Security profile for certificate verification.
+ *
+ * All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG().
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
+{
+ uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */
+ uint32_t allowed_pks; /**< PK algs for signatures */
+ uint32_t allowed_curves; /**< Elliptic curves for ECDSA */
+ uint32_t rsa_min_bitlen; /**< Minimum size for RSA keys */
+}
+mbedtls_x509_crt_profile;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 0
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2
+
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 32
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15
+
+#if !defined( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN )
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Container for writing a certificate (CRT)
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert
+{
+ int version;
+ mbedtls_mpi serial;
+ mbedtls_pk_context *subject_key;
+ mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key;
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject;
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *issuer;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+ char not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1];
+ char not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1];
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions;
+}
+mbedtls_x509write_cert;
+
+/**
+ * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
+ uint32_t flags;
+} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item;
+
+/**
+ * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 )
+
+/**
+ * Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain()
+ */
+typedef struct
+{
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item items[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE];
+ unsigned len;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+ /* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from
+ * the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured.
+ * We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its
+ * ownership to the caller. */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca_cb_result;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for resuming X.509 verify operations
+ */
+typedef struct
+{
+ /* for check_signature() */
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx pk;
+
+ /* for find_parent_in() */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *fallback_parent;
+ int fallback_signature_is_good;
+
+ /* for find_parent() */
+ int parent_is_trusted; /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */
+
+ /* for verify_chain() */
+ enum {
+ x509_crt_rs_none,
+ x509_crt_rs_find_parent,
+ } in_progress; /* none if no operation is in progress */
+ int self_cnt;
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
+
+} mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */
+typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * Default security profile. Should provide a good balance between security
+ * and compatibility with current deployments.
+ *
+ * This profile permits:
+ * - SHA2 hashes.
+ * - All supported elliptic curves.
+ * - RSA with 2048 bits and above.
+ *
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this profile, for example if
+ * new curves are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will
+ * not reduce this profile unless serious security concerns require it.
+ */
+extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
+
+/**
+ * Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments.
+ * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for allowing RSA-2048.
+ */
+extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next;
+
+/**
+ * NSA Suite B profile.
+ */
+extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
+ * to the end of the provided chained list.
+ *
+ * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
+ * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
+ * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate.
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
+ *
+ * \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer
+ * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused
+ * after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT
+ * buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints),
+ * use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen );
+
+/**
+ * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks.
+ *
+ * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when
+ * it encounters either an unsupported extension or a
+ * "certificate policies" extension containing any
+ * unsupported certificate policies.
+ * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback
+ * in other cases, if and when the need arises.
+ *
+ * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
+ * \param crt The certificate being parsed.
+ * \param oid The OID of the extension.
+ * \param critical Whether the extension is critical.
+ * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value
+ * (the content of the OCTET STRING).
+ * \param end End of extension value.
+ *
+ * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code
+ * if it can not parse or does not support the extension.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips
+ * the extension and continues parsing.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t)( void *p_ctx,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt const *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid,
+ int critical,
+ const unsigned char *p,
+ const unsigned char *end );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
+ * to the end of the provided chained list.
+ *
+ * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
+ * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
+ * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate.
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
+ * \param make_copy When not zero this function makes an internal copy of the
+ * CRT buffer \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed
+ * or reused after this call returns.
+ * When zero this function avoids duplicating the CRT buffer
+ * by taking temporary ownership thereof until the CRT
+ * is destroyed (like mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy())
+ * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate
+ * extension.
+ * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
+ *
+ * \note This call is functionally equivalent to
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), and/or
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy()
+ * but it calls the callback with every unsupported
+ * certificate extension and additionally the
+ * "certificate policies" extension if it contains any
+ * unsupported certificate policies.
+ * The callback must return a negative error code if it
+ * does not know how to handle such an extension.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips
+ * the extension and continues parsing.
+ * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback
+ * in other cases, if and when the need arises.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ int make_copy,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
+ void *p_ctx );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
+ * to the end of the provided chained list. This is a
+ * variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes
+ * temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT
+ * is destroyed.
+ *
+ * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
+ * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
+ * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
+ * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded
+ * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be
+ * retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the
+ * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed
+ * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free().
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
+ *
+ * \note This call is functionally equivalent to
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a
+ * copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime
+ * constraints. This is useful in constrained environments
+ * where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded
+ * certificates and add them to the chained list.
+ *
+ * For CRTs in PEM encoding, the function parses permissively:
+ * if at least one certificate can be parsed, the function
+ * returns the number of certificates for which parsing failed
+ * (hence \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully).
+ * If no certificate could be parsed, the function returns
+ * the first (negative) error encountered during parsing.
+ *
+ * PEM encoded certificates may be interleaved by other data
+ * such as human readable descriptions of their content, as
+ * long as the certificates are enclosed in the PEM specific
+ * '-----{BEGIN/END} CERTIFICATE-----' delimiters.
+ *
+ * \param chain The chain to which to add the parsed certificates.
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the certificate data in PEM or DER format.
+ * For certificates in PEM encoding, this may be a concatenation
+ * of multiple certificates; for DER encoding, the buffer must
+ * comprise exactly one certificate.
+ * \param buflen The size of \p buf, including the terminating \c NULL byte
+ * in case of PEM encoded data.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully.
+ * \return The (positive) number of certificates that couldn't
+ * be parsed if parsing was partly successful (see above).
+ * \return A negative X509 or PEM error code otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief Load one or more certificates and add them
+ * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some
+ * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number
+ * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete
+ * correctly, the first error is returned.
+ *
+ * \param chain points to the start of the chain
+ * \param path filename to read the certificates from
+ *
+ * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number
+ * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Load one or more certificate files from a path and add them
+ * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some
+ * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number
+ * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete
+ * correctly, the first error is returned.
+ *
+ * \param chain points to the start of the chain
+ * \param path directory / folder to read the certificate files from
+ *
+ * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number
+ * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+/**
+ * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames
+ * extension.
+ *
+ * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject
+ * alternative name.
+ * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation
+ * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw.
+ *
+ * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name
+ * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported.
+ *
+ * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of
+ * subject alternative name. For example, after successful
+ * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the
+ * \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the
+ * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the
+ * lifetime of the certificate.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported
+ * SAN type.
+ * \return Another negative value for any other failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san );
+/**
+ * \brief Returns an informational string about the
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to
+ * \param size Maximum size of buffer
+ * \param prefix A line prefix
+ * \param crt The X509 certificate to represent
+ *
+ * \return The length of the string written (not including the
+ * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Returns an informational string about the
+ * verification status of a certificate.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to
+ * \param size Maximum size of buffer
+ * \param prefix A line prefix
+ * \param flags Verification flags created by mbedtls_x509_crt_verify()
+ *
+ * \return The length of the string written (not including the
+ * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
+ uint32_t flags );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify a chain of certificates.
+ *
+ * The verify callback is a user-supplied callback that
+ * can clear / modify / add flags for a certificate. If set,
+ * the verification callback is called for each
+ * certificate in the chain (from the trust-ca down to the
+ * presented crt). The parameters for the callback are:
+ * (void *parameter, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth,
+ * int *flags). With the flags representing current flags for
+ * that specific certificate and the certificate depth from
+ * the bottom (Peer cert depth = 0).
+ *
+ * All flags left after returning from the callback
+ * are also returned to the application. The function should
+ * return 0 for anything (including invalid certificates)
+ * other than fatal error, as a non-zero return code
+ * immediately aborts the verification process. For fatal
+ * errors, a specific error code should be used (different
+ * from MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED which should not
+ * be returned at this point), or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR
+ * can be used if no better code is available.
+ *
+ * \note In case verification failed, the results can be displayed
+ * using \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info()
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() with the
+ * default security profile.
+ *
+ * \note It is your responsibility to provide up-to-date CRLs for
+ * all trusted CAs. If no CRL is provided for the CA that was
+ * used to sign the certificate, CRL verification is skipped
+ * silently, that is *without* setting any flag.
+ *
+ * \note The \c trust_ca list can contain two types of certificates:
+ * (1) those of trusted root CAs, so that certificates
+ * chaining up to those CAs will be trusted, and (2)
+ * self-signed end-entity certificates to be trusted (for
+ * specific peers you know) - in that case, the self-signed
+ * certificate doesn't need to have the CA bit set.
+ *
+ * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
+ * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
+ * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
+ * \param cn The expected Common Name. This will be checked to be
+ * present in the certificate's subjectAltNames extension or,
+ * if this extension is absent, as a CN component in its
+ * Subject name. Currently only DNS names are supported. This
+ * may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified.
+ * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
+ * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
+ * set to (uint32_t) -1.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
+ * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
+ * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the
+ * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the
+ * certificate chain verification failed. In this case,
+ * \c *flags will have one or more
+ * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX
+ * flags set.
+ * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error
+ * encountered during the verification process.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify a chain of certificates with respect to
+ * a configurable security profile.
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(), but with explicit
+ * security profile.
+ *
+ * \note The restrictions on keys (RSA minimum size, allowed curves
+ * for ECDSA) apply to all certificates: trusted root,
+ * intermediate CAs if any, and end entity certificate.
+ *
+ * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
+ * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
+ * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
+ * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification.
+ * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
+ * CN need not be verified.
+ * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
+ * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
+ * set to (uint32_t) -1.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
+ * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
+ * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the
+ * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the
+ * certificate chain verification failed. In this case,
+ * \c *flags will have one or more
+ * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX
+ * flags set.
+ * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error
+ * encountered during the verification process.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile()
+ *
+ * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile()
+ * but can return early and restart according to the limit
+ * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
+ *
+ * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
+ * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
+ * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
+ * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification.
+ * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
+ * CN need not be verified.
+ * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
+ * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
+ * set to (uint32_t) -1.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
+ * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
+ * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be set to \c NULL
+ * to disable restartable ECC.
+ *
+ * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(), or
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
+
+/**
+ * \brief The type of trusted certificate callbacks.
+ *
+ * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the CRT
+ * verification routine mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()
+ * when looking for trusted signers of a given certificate.
+ *
+ * On success, the callback returns a list of trusted
+ * certificates to be considered as potential signers
+ * for the input certificate.
+ *
+ * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
+ * \param child The certificate for which to search a potential signer.
+ * This will point to a readable certificate.
+ * \param candidate_cas The address at which to store the address of the first
+ * entry in the generated linked list of candidate signers.
+ * This will not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \note The callback must only return a non-zero value on a
+ * fatal error. If, in contrast, the search for a potential
+ * signer completes without a single candidate, the
+ * callback must return \c 0 and set \c *candidate_cas
+ * to \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *candidate_cas points
+ * to a heap-allocated linked list of instances of
+ * ::mbedtls_x509_crt, and ownership of this list is passed
+ * to the caller.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t)( void *p_ctx,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt const *child,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt **candidate_cas );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+/**
+ * \brief Version of \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() which
+ * uses a callback to acquire the list of trusted CA
+ * certificates.
+ *
+ * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
+ * \param f_ca_cb The callback to be used to query for potential signers
+ * of a given child certificate. See the documentation of
+ * ::mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t for more information.
+ * \param p_ca_cb The opaque context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb.
+ * \param profile The security profile for the verification.
+ * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
+ * CN need not be verified.
+ * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
+ * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
+ * set to (uint32_t) -1.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
+ * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
+ * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
+ *
+ * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile().
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
+ void *p_ca_cb,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
+/**
+ * \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension.
+ *
+ * \param crt Leaf certificate used.
+ * \param usage Intended usage(s) (eg MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
+ * before using the certificate to perform an RSA key
+ * exchange).
+ *
+ * \note Except for decipherOnly and encipherOnly, a bit set in the
+ * usage argument means this bit MUST be set in the
+ * certificate. For decipherOnly and encipherOnly, it means
+ * that bit MAY be set.
+ *
+ * \return 0 is these uses of the certificate are allowed,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keyUsage extension
+ * is present but does not match the usage argument.
+ *
+ * \note You should only call this function on leaf certificates, on
+ * (intermediate) CAs the keyUsage extension is automatically
+ * checked by \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ unsigned int usage );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)
+/**
+ * \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage.
+ *
+ * \param crt Leaf certificate used.
+ * \param usage_oid Intended usage (eg MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH or
+ * MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH).
+ * \param usage_len Length of usage_oid (eg given by MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE()).
+ *
+ * \return 0 if this use of the certificate is allowed,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if not.
+ *
+ * \note Usually only makes sense on leaf certificates.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ const char *usage_oid,
+ size_t usage_len );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Verify the certificate revocation status
+ *
+ * \param crt a certificate to be verified
+ * \param crl the CRL to verify against
+ *
+ * \return 1 if the certificate is revoked, 0 otherwise
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a certificate (chain)
+ *
+ * \param crt Certificate chain to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Unallocate all certificate data
+ *
+ * \param crt Certificate chain to free
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the components of a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+/* \} name */
+/* \} addtogroup x509_module */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a CRT writing context
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the verion for a Certificate
+ * Default: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param version version to set (MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 or
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3)
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param serial serial number to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate
+ * Timestamps should be in string format for UTC timezone
+ * i.e. "YYYYMMDDhhmmss"
+ * e.g. "20131231235959" for December 31st 2013
+ * at 23:59:59
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param not_before not_before timestamp
+ * \param not_after not_after timestamp
+ *
+ * \return 0 if timestamp was parsed successfully, or
+ * a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before,
+ const char *not_after );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the issuer name for a Certificate
+ * Issuer names should contain a comma-separated list
+ * of OID types and values:
+ * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS CA"
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param issuer_name issuer name to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if issuer name was parsed successfully, or
+ * a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ const char *issuer_name );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the subject name for a Certificate
+ * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list
+ * of OID types and values:
+ * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS Server 1"
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param subject_name subject name to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or
+ * a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ const char *subject_name );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the subject public key for the certificate
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param key public key to include
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the issuer key used for signing the certificate
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param key private key to sign with
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the
+ * CRT
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param oid OID of the extension
+ * \param oid_len length of the OID
+ * \param critical if the extension is critical (per the RFC's definition)
+ * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING
+ * \param val_len length of the value data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ int critical,
+ const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the basicConstraints extension for a CRT
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param is_ca is this a CA certificate
+ * \param max_pathlen maximum length of certificate chains below this
+ * certificate (only for CA certificates, -1 is
+ * inlimited)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ int is_ca, int max_pathlen );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the subjectKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT
+ * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key() has been
+ * called before
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the authorityKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT
+ * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key() has been
+ * called before
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param key_usage key usage flags to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ unsigned int key_usage );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the contents of a CRT write context
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to free
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 DER structure
+ * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the
+ * return value to determine where you should start
+ * using the buffer
+ *
+ * \param ctx certificate to write away
+ * \param buf buffer to write to
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note)
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific
+ * error code
+ *
+ * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the
+ * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable
+ * for countermeasures against timing attacks).
+ * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 PEM string
+ *
+ * \param ctx certificate to write away
+ * \param buf buffer to write to
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note)
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code
+ *
+ * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the
+ * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable
+ * for countermeasures against timing attacks).
+ * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_x509_crt.h */