blob: dacc075c8fd2fee602befeccb327f5798d6dbe62 (
plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
|
#include "pch.h"
#include "securitypatches.h"
#include "hookutils.h"
#include "concommand.h"
#include "dedicated.h"
#include "tier0.h"
typedef bool(*IsValveModType)();
IsValveModType IsValveMod;
bool IsValveModHook()
{
// basically: by default r2 isn't set as a valve mod, meaning that m_bRestrictServerCommands is false
// this is HORRIBLE for security, because it means servers can run arbitrary concommands on clients
// especially since we have script commands this could theoretically be awful
return !CommandLine()->CheckParm("-norestrictservercommands");
}
void InitialiseClientEngineSecurityPatches(HMODULE baseAddress)
{
if (IsDedicated())
return;
HookEnabler hook;
// note: this could break some things
ENABLER_CREATEHOOK(hook, (char*)baseAddress + 0x1C6360, &IsValveModHook, reinterpret_cast<LPVOID*>(&IsValveMod));
// patches to make commands run from client/ui script still work
// note: this is likely preventable in a nicer way? test prolly
{
void* ptr = (char*)baseAddress + 0x4FB65;
TempReadWrite rw(ptr);
*((char*)ptr) = (char)0xEB;
*((char*)ptr + 1) = (char)0x11;
}
{
void* ptr = (char*)baseAddress + 0x4FBAC;
TempReadWrite rw(ptr);
*((char*)ptr) = (char)0xEB;
*((char*)ptr + 1) = (char)0x16;
}
// byte patches to patch concommands that this messes up that we need
{
// disconnect concommand
void* ptr = (char*)baseAddress + 0x5ADA2D;
TempReadWrite rw(ptr);
*((int*)ptr) |= FCVAR_SERVER_CAN_EXECUTE;
}
}
|
