From 9db10386430479067795bec66bb26343ff176ded Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Harrison Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 06:37:41 -0400 Subject: Removed old mbedtls, replacing with submodule. --- lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/dhm.c | 719 --------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 719 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/dhm.c (limited to 'lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/dhm.c') diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/dhm.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/dhm.c deleted file mode 100644 index accd5a8..0000000 --- a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/dhm.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,719 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation - * of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm: - * - * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 12 - * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone - * - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - -#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) -#include "mbedtls/pem.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) -#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) - -#define DHM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) -#define DHM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) - -/* - * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it - */ -static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X, - unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end ) -{ - int ret, n; - - if( end - *p < 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; - (*p) += 2; - - if( (int)( end - *p ) < n ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ) ); - - (*p) += n; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Verify sanity of parameter with regards to P - * - * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2 - * - * This means that we need to return an error if - * public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2 - * - * For more information on the attack, see: - * http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf - * http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643 - */ -static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi U; - int ret = 0; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( param, 2 ) < 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) > 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); - return( ret ); -} - -void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) -{ - DHM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); -} - -/* - * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, - unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL && *p != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); - - if( ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->P, p, end ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->G, p, end ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->GY, p, end ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Pick a random R in the range [2, M-2] for blinding or key generation. - */ -static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( R, R, 1 ) ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -static int dhm_make_common( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret = 0; - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( x_size < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( (unsigned) x_size < mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ) ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - } - else - { - /* Generate X as large as possible ( <= P - 2 ) */ - ret = dhm_random_below( &ctx->X, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ); - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - } - - /* - * Calculate GX = G^X mod P - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X, - &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) ); - - if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - size_t n1, n2, n3; - unsigned char *p; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - - ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - /* - * Export P, G, GX. RFC 5246 §4.4 states that "leading zero octets are - * not required". We omit leading zeros for compactness. - */ -#define DHM_MPI_EXPORT( X, n ) \ - do { \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( ( X ), \ - p + 2, \ - ( n ) ) ); \ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( n ) >> 8 ); \ - *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( n ) ); \ - p += ( n ); \ - } while( 0 ) - - n1 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); - n2 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->G ); - n3 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->GX ); - - p = output; - DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->P , n1 ); - DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->G , n2 ); - DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->GX, n3 ); - - *olen = p - output; - - ctx->len = n1; - -cleanup: - if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ); - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Set prime modulus and generator - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, - const mbedtls_mpi *P, - const mbedtls_mpi *G ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->G, G ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret ) ); - } - - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Import the peer's public value G^Y - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - - if( ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->GY, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Create own private value X and export G^X - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, - unsigned char *output, size_t olen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - - if( olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->GX, output, olen ) ); - -cleanup: - if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ); - return( ret ); -} - - -/* - * Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of: - * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, - * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer - * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. - */ -static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_mpi R; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); - - /* - * Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used, - * but remember it to use blinding next time. - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->pX ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->pX, &ctx->X ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vf, 1 ) ); - - return( 0 ); - } - - /* - * Ok, we need blinding. Can we re-use existing values? - * If yes, just update them by squaring them. - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); - - return( 0 ); - } - - /* - * We need to generate blinding values from scratch - */ - - /* Vi = random( 2, P-2 ) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P - * First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod), - * then elevate to the Xth power. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Derive and export the shared secret (G^Y)^X mod P - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, - unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi GYb; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - - if( output_size < ctx->len ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &GYb ); - - /* Blind peer's value */ - if( f_rng != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) ); - } - else - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &GYb, &ctx->GY ) ); - - /* Do modular exponentiation */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X, - &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); - - /* Unblind secret value */ - if( f_rng != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) ); - } - - /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory - * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */ - *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->K ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->K, output, *olen ) ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &GYb ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED, ret ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Free the components of a DHM key - */ -void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->pX ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->K ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GY ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GX ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->X ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->G ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) -/* - * Parse DHM parameters - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, - size_t dhminlen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; - unsigned char *p, *end; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_pem_context pem; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhmin != NULL ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); - - /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ - if( dhminlen == 0 || dhmin[dhminlen - 1] != '\0' ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; - else - ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, - "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----", - "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----", - dhmin, NULL, 0, &dhminlen ); - - if( ret == 0 ) - { - /* - * Was PEM encoded - */ - dhminlen = pem.buflen; - } - else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) - goto exit; - - p = ( ret == 0 ) ? pem.buf : (unsigned char *) dhmin; -#else - p = (unsigned char *) dhmin; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - end = p + dhminlen; - - /* - * DHParams ::= SEQUENCE { - * prime INTEGER, -- P - * generator INTEGER, -- g - * privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL - * } - */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); - goto exit; - } - - end = p + len; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->P ) ) != 0 || - ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->G ) ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); - goto exit; - } - - if( p != end ) - { - /* This might be the optional privateValueLength. - * If so, we can cleanly discard it */ - mbedtls_mpi rec; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &rec ); - ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &rec ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &rec ); - if ( ret != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); - goto exit; - } - if ( p != end ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); - goto exit; - } - } - - ret = 0; - - dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &dhm->P ); - -exit: -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); -#endif - if( ret != 0 ) - mbedtls_dhm_free( dhm ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -/* - * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. - * - * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. - * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced - * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. - */ -static int load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) -{ - FILE *f; - long size; - - if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); - if( ( size = ftell( f ) ) == -1 ) - { - fclose( f ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - } - fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); - - *n = (size_t) size; - - if( *n + 1 == 0 || - ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL ) - { - fclose( f ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n ) - { - fclose( f ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buf, *n + 1 ); - mbedtls_free( *buf ); - - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - } - - fclose( f ); - - (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; - - if( strstr( (const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN " ) != NULL ) - ++*n; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Load and parse DHM parameters - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - unsigned char *buf; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); - - if( ( ret = load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( dhm, buf, n ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); - mbedtls_free( buf ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) -static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = -"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n" -"MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n" -"1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n" -"9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n" -"-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"; -#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ -static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = { - 0x30, 0x81, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x44, - 0x3a, 0x09, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x39, 0xa9, 0x79, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x07, 0x0d, - 0xf5, 0x33, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x38, 0xbe, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xf3, - 0xc7, 0x14, 0x55, 0x33, 0x28, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x80, 0x9b, 0xe1, - 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x9f, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x54, 0x43, 0x18, - 0x82, 0x53, 0xa9, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x68, 0x18, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xde, 0x5a, - 0x40, 0xd3, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x74, 0x74, 0xc1, - 0x25, 0xc1, 0x99, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x8f, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0xea, 0x73, 0x3d, 0xf6, - 0xf6, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x2a, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd1, 0x0c, 0x64, - 0xe6, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0xc6, 0xea, 0x73, 0xd0, 0xdc, 0xa8, - 0x56, 0x9b, 0xe2, 0xba, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x23, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x2f, - 0x49, 0x75, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_dhm_params ); - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; - - mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " DHM parameter load: " ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( &dhm, - (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_dhm_params, - mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n" ); - -exit: - mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ -- cgit v1.2.3