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authorAdam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com>2022-11-26 16:20:59 -0500
committerAdam Harrison <adamdharrison@gmail.com>2022-11-29 18:39:46 -0500
commitfc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875 (patch)
tree6e7723c3f45d39f06c243d9c18a3c038da948793 /lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/pk_wrap.c
parent3836606e2b735ba7b2dc0f580231843660587fb4 (diff)
downloadlite-xl-plugin-manager-fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875.tar.gz
lite-xl-plugin-manager-fc0c4ed9a3103e0e6534311923668879fc8e0875.zip
Removed openssl, and curl, and added mbedded tls.curl-removal
Almost fully removed curl, needs more testing. Fixed most issues, now trying to cross compile. Fix? Sigh.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/pk_wrap.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/pk_wrap.c1069
1 files changed, 1069 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/pk_wrap.c b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/pk_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..107e912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/mbedtls-2.27.0/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1069 @@
+/*
+ * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#else
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
+#define mbedtls_free free
+#endif
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+static int rsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
+{
+ return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS );
+}
+
+static size_t rsa_get_bitlen( const void *ctx )
+{
+ const mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
+ return( 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) );
+}
+
+static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
+ size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
+
+ if( sig_len < rsa_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, NULL, NULL,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg,
+ (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ /* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data.
+ * We have a special error code for that so that so that callers can
+ * use mbedtls_pk_verify() to check "Does the buffer start with a
+ * valid signature?" and not just "Does the buffer contain a valid
+ * signature?". */
+ if( sig_len > rsa_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int rsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
+
+ *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
+
+ return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
+ md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) );
+}
+
+static int rsa_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
+
+ if( ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) );
+}
+
+static int rsa_encrypt_wrap( void *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
+ *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
+
+ if( *olen > osize )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
+
+ return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
+ ilen, input, output ) );
+}
+
+static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+{
+ return( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub,
+ (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv ) );
+}
+
+static void *rsa_alloc_wrap( void )
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) );
+
+ if( ctx != NULL )
+ mbedtls_rsa_init( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, 0, 0 );
+
+ return( ctx );
+}
+
+static void rsa_free_wrap( void *ctx )
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx );
+ mbedtls_free( ctx );
+}
+
+static void rsa_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items )
+{
+ items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI;
+ items->name = "rsa.N";
+ items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->N );
+
+ items++;
+
+ items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI;
+ items->name = "rsa.E";
+ items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->E );
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ "RSA",
+ rsa_get_bitlen,
+ rsa_can_do,
+ rsa_verify_wrap,
+ rsa_sign_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ rsa_decrypt_wrap,
+ rsa_encrypt_wrap,
+ rsa_check_pair_wrap,
+ rsa_alloc_wrap,
+ rsa_free_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ rsa_debug,
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+/*
+ * Generic EC key
+ */
+static int eckey_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
+{
+ return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA );
+}
+
+static size_t eckey_get_bitlen( const void *ctx )
+{
+ return( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+/* Forward declarations */
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len );
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng );
+
+static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
+
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 )
+ ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len );
+
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+static int eckey_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
+
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 )
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng );
+
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/* Forward declarations */
+static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ void *rs_ctx );
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ void *rs_ctx );
+
+/*
+ * Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context
+ *
+ * We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to
+ * the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time.
+ */
+typedef struct
+{
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs;
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx;
+} eckey_restart_ctx;
+
+static void *eckey_rs_alloc( void )
+{
+ eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
+
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( eckey_restart_ctx ) );
+
+ if( ctx != NULL )
+ {
+ rs_ctx = ctx;
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs );
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx );
+ }
+
+ return( ctx );
+}
+
+static void eckey_rs_free( void *ctx )
+{
+ eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
+
+ if( ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ rs_ctx = ctx;
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs );
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx );
+
+ mbedtls_free( ctx );
+}
+
+static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ void *rs_ctx )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if( rs == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
+ if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 )
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx,
+ md_alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) );
+
+cleanup:
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ void *rs_ctx )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if( rs == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
+ if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 )
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) );
+
+cleanup:
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+{
+ return( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub,
+ (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv ) );
+}
+
+static void *eckey_alloc_wrap( void )
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) );
+
+ if( ctx != NULL )
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx );
+
+ return( ctx );
+}
+
+static void eckey_free_wrap( void *ctx )
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx );
+ mbedtls_free( ctx );
+}
+
+static void eckey_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items )
+{
+ items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP;
+ items->name = "eckey.Q";
+ items->value = &( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->Q );
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY,
+ "EC",
+ eckey_get_bitlen,
+ eckey_can_do,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ eckey_verify_wrap,
+ eckey_sign_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ eckey_verify_rs_wrap,
+ eckey_sign_rs_wrap,
+#endif
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ eckey_check_pair,
+ eckey_alloc_wrap,
+ eckey_free_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ eckey_rs_alloc,
+ eckey_rs_free,
+#endif
+ eckey_debug,
+};
+
+/*
+ * EC key restricted to ECDH
+ */
+static int eckeydh_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
+{
+ return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH );
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH,
+ "EC_DH",
+ eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */
+ eckeydh_can_do,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ eckey_check_pair,
+ eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
+ eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+static int ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
+{
+ return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/*
+ * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of
+ * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA.
+ */
+static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int( unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char *to, size_t to_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t unpadded_len, padding_len;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( from, end, &unpadded_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ while( unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00 )
+ {
+ ( *from )++;
+ unpadded_len--;
+ }
+
+ if( unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
+
+ padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len;
+ memset( to, 0x00, padding_len );
+ memcpy( to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len );
+ ( *from ) += unpadded_len;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers
+ * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least
+ * twice as big as int_size.
+ */
+static int extract_ecdsa_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t tmp_size;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &tmp_size,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ /* Extract r */
+ if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig, int_size ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ /* Extract s */
+ if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig + int_size, int_size ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
+{
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ mbedtls_pk_context key;
+ int key_len;
+ /* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */
+ unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY;
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve =
+ mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits );
+ const size_t signature_part_size = ( ctx->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8;
+ ((void) md_alg);
+
+ if( curve == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context;
+ * re-construct one to make it happy */
+ key.pk_info = &pk_info;
+ key.pk_ctx = ctx;
+ p = buf + sizeof( buf );
+ key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &p, buf, &key );
+ if( key_len <= 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve ) );
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, psa_sig_md );
+
+ status = psa_import_key( &attributes,
+ buf + sizeof( buf ) - key_len, key_len,
+ &key_id );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status );
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can
+ * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */
+ if( 2 * signature_part_size > sizeof( buf ) )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char*) sig;
+ if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig( &p, sig + sig_len, buf,
+ signature_part_size ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if( psa_verify_hash( key_id, psa_sig_md,
+ hash, hash_len,
+ buf, 2 * signature_part_size )
+ != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if( p != sig + sig_len )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ psa_destroy_key( key_id );
+ return( ret );
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ ((void) md_alg);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len );
+
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+ return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
+ md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ void *rs_ctx )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ ((void) md_alg);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
+ (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
+ (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx );
+
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ void *rs_ctx )
+{
+ return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
+ (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
+ md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng,
+ (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ) );
+
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void )
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_context ) );
+
+ if( ctx != NULL )
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_init( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx );
+
+ return( ctx );
+}
+
+static void ecdsa_free_wrap( void *ctx )
+{
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_free( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx );
+ mbedtls_free( ctx );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc( void )
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ) );
+
+ if( ctx != NULL )
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( ctx );
+
+ return( ctx );
+}
+
+static void ecdsa_rs_free( void *ctx )
+{
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( ctx );
+ mbedtls_free( ctx );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
+ "ECDSA",
+ eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */
+ ecdsa_can_do,
+ ecdsa_verify_wrap,
+ ecdsa_sign_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap,
+ ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap,
+#endif
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */
+ ecdsa_alloc_wrap,
+ ecdsa_free_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ ecdsa_rs_alloc,
+ ecdsa_rs_free,
+#endif
+ eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+/*
+ * Support for alternative RSA-private implementations
+ */
+
+static int rsa_alt_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
+{
+ return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
+}
+
+static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen( const void *ctx )
+{
+ const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx;
+
+ return( 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) );
+}
+
+static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx;
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if( UINT_MAX < hash_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
+
+ *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key );
+ if( *sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ return( rsa_alt->sign_func( rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
+ md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) );
+}
+
+static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx;
+
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+
+ if( ilen != rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ return( rsa_alt->decrypt_func( rsa_alt->key,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+{
+ unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char hash[32];
+ size_t sig_len = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if( rsa_alt_get_bitlen( prv ) != rsa_get_bitlen( pub ) )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
+
+ memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof( hash ) );
+
+ if( ( ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap( (void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ hash, sizeof( hash ),
+ sig, &sig_len, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ if( rsa_verify_wrap( (void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ hash, sizeof( hash ), sig, sig_len ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap( void )
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) );
+
+ if( ctx != NULL )
+ memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) );
+
+ return( ctx );
+}
+
+static void rsa_alt_free_wrap( void *ctx )
+{
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) );
+ mbedtls_free( ctx );
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT,
+ "RSA-alt",
+ rsa_alt_get_bitlen,
+ rsa_alt_can_do,
+ NULL,
+ rsa_alt_sign_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ rsa_alt_check_pair,
+#else
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ rsa_alt_alloc_wrap,
+ rsa_alt_free_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ NULL,
+};
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+
+static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap( void )
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) );
+
+ /* no _init() function to call, an calloc() already zeroized */
+
+ return( ctx );
+}
+
+static void pk_opaque_free_wrap( void *ctx )
+{
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) );
+ mbedtls_free( ctx );
+}
+
+static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen( const void *ctx )
+{
+ const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx;
+ size_t bits;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes ) )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+ return( bits );
+}
+
+static int pk_opaque_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
+{
+ /* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs,
+ * as checked by setup_psa().
+ * Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */
+ return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+
+/*
+ * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer
+ * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer.
+ * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi().
+ *
+ * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer
+ * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end
+ * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start
+ */
+static int asn1_write_mpibuf( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
+ size_t n_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ if( (size_t)( *p - start ) < n_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
+
+ len = n_len;
+ *p -= len;
+ memmove( *p, start, len );
+
+ /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s.
+ * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect
+ * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */
+ while( len > 0 && **p == 0x00 )
+ {
+ ++(*p);
+ --len;
+ }
+
+ /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */
+ if( len == 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+
+ /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0.
+ * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */
+ if( **p & 0x80 )
+ {
+ if( *p - start < 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
+
+ *--(*p) = 0x00;
+ len += 1;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) );
+
+ return( (int) len );
+}
+
+/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence.
+ * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of
+ * MPIs, and in-place.
+ *
+ * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding
+ * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding
+ * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer
+ */
+static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ size_t buf_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2;
+ unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig + rs_len, rs_len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig, rs_len ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, sig, len ) );
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, sig,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
+
+ memmove( sig, p, len );
+ *sig_len = len;
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ ((void) ctx);
+ ((void) md_alg);
+ ((void) hash);
+ ((void) hash_len);
+ ((void) sig);
+ ((void) sig_len);
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+ const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ) );
+ size_t buf_len;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ /* PSA has its own RNG */
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+
+ /* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide
+ * that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a
+ * maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is
+ * buggy anyway). */
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) );
+ buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) );
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+ if( buf_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ /* make the signature */
+ status = psa_sign_hash( *key, alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, buf_len, sig_len );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) );
+
+ /* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */
+ return( pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( sig, sig_len, buf_len ) );
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
+ "Opaque",
+ pk_opaque_get_bitlen,
+ pk_opaque_can_do,
+ NULL, /* verify - will be done later */
+ pk_opaque_sign_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */
+ NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */
+#endif
+ NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */
+ NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */
+ NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */
+ pk_opaque_alloc_wrap,
+ pk_opaque_free_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */
+ NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */
+#endif
+ NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */
+};
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */